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41. Introduction
As air traffic in the United States has increased through the years, the burden of assuring 
separation among all Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) aircraft in the National Airspace System 
(NAS) has steadily increased.  In order to carry out this function in a safe and efficient manner, a 
complex Air Traffic Management (ATM) system has been established consisting of airspace 
design, rules and procedures, voice and data communications, primary and secondary 
surveillance radar equipment, controller displays, and controller support tools.  All of this is 
managed by a dedicated controller workforce that remains responsible for the safety of IFR 
flights in respective control sectors. While this highly manual traffic separation service has 
maintained a sufficient level of safety in flight operations, the manner in which aircraft 
separation is assured limits capacity and constrains the operators’ efficiency and flexibility in 
planning and flying business trajectories of their choice. 
The restrictions common to IFR operations today have their roots in the earliest days of 
instrument navigation, when aircraft first ventured into the clouds (ref. 1).  Without being able to 
see the ground to navigate or other aircraft to remain clear, operators had to rely on ground-based 
radio navigation aids and separation services, the latter provided through procedural separation 
and later also through radar-based separation.  The human element of Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
inherently limited the number and traffic flow configuration of aircraft that could be safely 
managed.  This gave rise to most of the IFR restrictions in place today, such as ground delay 
programs, congestion-based reroutes, speed and miles-in-trail restrictions, altitude level-offs in 
climb and descent, and use of structured routes and cardinal cruising altitudes.  These 
restrictions, necessary for human controllers to meet their primary responsibility of separating 
aircraft, were derived from the limited technology available as air traffic services were 
formulated. 
An alternative provision for separation assurance called “self-separation,” now enabled by 
emerging technologies, allows the responsibility for separation to be distributed among ground 
and airborne elements.  Evolved over many years of research and development (refs.2-10), self-
separation places the responsibility for maintaining safe and legal distances from one aircraft to 
all other aircraft with the pilot, using on-board systems and procedures designed to support this 
function.  While executing the self-separation function, such aircraft would be operating under a 
flight status proposed here called “Autonomous Flight Rules” (AFR). Through new policy and a 
significant update to the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), the equipment, training, and 
procedural requirements defined in support of AFR operations would be established so as to 
meet the stringent safety requirements of a primary separation system.  Aircraft and pilots 
operating under AFR would maintain separation from all other aircraft in the airspace, including 
Visual Flight Rules (VFR) aircraft, IFR aircraft, and other AFR aircraft.  AFR aircraft also would 
self-separate from terrain and obstacles, hazardous weather, and operationally restricted Special 
Use Airspace (SUA).  They are thus removed from the ground-based ATM system’s 
responsibility for the separation function whenever operating under the rules of this application. 
Normally, this application spans from the time the AFR aircraft are released by the Air 
Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) during departure until they are reinserted into the landing 
flow to a runway.  The AFR aircraft cooperatively share their current trajectories and any 
changes with other aircraft and the ANSP, and they adjust their trajectories as needed to achieve 
the ANSP arrival plan for that aircraft.     
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airborne surveillance technology, Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B).  ADS-
B will provide to AFR aircraft the position, altitude, and velocity vector (state vector) of other 
aircraft in the vicinity, as well as their target state if turning or changing altitude.  Additional 
trajectory intent data will be provided by ADS-B and/or ground systems such as System Wide 
Information Management (SWIM).  Backup airborne surveillance capability will be provided by 
a ground-based Traffic Information Service Broadcast (TIS-B) system and by the aircraft-to-
aircraft Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Both of these systems make use 
of the transponders in other aircraft for surveillance independent of the ADS-B positioning 
information. Weather information will be available from both on-board sensors and access to 
ground-based weather products provided either by an Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) 
center or government and commercial weather services through air-ground data link. SUA status 
and other NAS information will also be available digitally to the automation onboard the AFR 
aircraft.  In addition to cooperative airborne surveillance, self-separation is technically enabled 
by an “Airborne Separation Assistance System” (ASAS), a software automation system onboard 
the AFR aircraft.  Integrated with the aircraft’s navigation, surveillance, and display systems, the 
ASAS will model the traffic situation and perform conflict detection, resolution, and prevention 
functions.  It will provide guidance to the AFR pilots to plan for and maintain separation from 
other aircraft, restricted airspace, and weather hazards. The ASAS will also assist the pilots in 
conforming to arrival and other operational constraints, such as a Required Time of Arrival 
(RTA), without compromising separation. 
Benefits of AFR operations should accrue to both the aircraft operators and the ANSP.  Under 
AFR, flight trajectories are under direct control of the aircraft operator, rather than the ANSP.  
Having assumed responsibility for separation for the aircraft, the operator may select flight 
trajectories that more closely match the business case optimum, producing both cost reductions 
and environmental benefits.  In addition, because an AFR aircraft imposes minimal burden on 
the en route ground system for separation, the aircraft should be exempted from Traffic Flow 
Management (TFM) initiatives associated with en route congestion and can depart and arrive 
much closer to the operator’s preferred schedule.  Once airborne, the AFR pilot has the authority 
and maximum flexibility to alter the trajectory according to changing requirements.  ANSP 
benefits should also accrue.  AFR aircraft will not be managed by controllers, opening up 
additional ground system capacity for IFR aircraft and increasing the ANSP ability to more 
strategically manage NAS resources. AFR flights will be able to operate in the same airspace 
with IFR and VFR operations, thereby reducing the need for complex airspace structures or 
segregated operations far from the optimum business trajectories of AFR and IFR aircraft.  The 
flexibility to conduct AFR operations side by side with IFR and VFR is expected to be an 
important element to the AFR investment decision by operators and acceptability by the ANSP. 
As IFR flights convert to AFR, controller workload will be reduced, and the absence of complex 
airspace structures for segregation will greatly simplify coordination and handoff procedures.  
With right-of-way given to the IFR aircraft by default, controllers will be able to focus their 
attention and services on the IFR population, while the AFR traffic will be required to give way 
to all IFR traffic.   
The context of AFR can be either homogeneous operations (i.e., all AFR) or mixed operations 
(i.e., AFR, VFR, and IFR in shared airspace) in concert with the variety of concepts for the 
ANSP and ground-based operations described in Next Generation Air Transportation System 
6(NextGen) documentation (ref. 11).  The AFR concept description herein emphasizes mixed 
operations and purposefully avoids specifying any particular concept for IFR operations to 
illustrate the flexibility of the AFR concept.  Key differences and similarities between AFR, 
VFR, and IFR operations will be enumerated in various sections of this document when useful to 
describe the concept of AFR operations.  The AFR domain described herein encompasses 
primarily the climb, en route, and initial descent phases of flight in US domestic airspace.  It may 
terminate at the boundary of terminal airspace or, with ground automation, at an arrival merge 
point or metering fix.  It may also smoothly integrate with and transition to Interval Management 
arrival operations. 
The purpose of this paper is to define the concept of AFR in moderate detail.  The concept is the 
culmination of more than a decade of research and development (refs. 9, 10).  At the behest of 
the airspace user community, it could be implemented by the FAA, once the underlying enabling 
technologies and procedures have been sufficiently developed and then proven to regulators and 
certification specialists that they are capable of ensuring the safe, reliable, and efficient flow of 
aircraft.  This document focuses its description on piloted AFR aircraft.  Unmanned Aircraft 
System (UAS) vehicles, either remotely or autonomously piloted, would also be eligible for AFR 
operations.  However, unique considerations for UAS vehicles to operate under AFR, although 
not expected to be significant, are beyond the scope of this document. Section 2 describes the 
context in which AFR operations are defined.  Section 3 presents the objectives of AFR and its 
expected benefits.  In Section 4, the Autonomous Flight Rules are described, including 
requirements for equipment, the flight crew, the airspace environment, conflict-free trajectories, 
coordination, and right-of-way.  Section 5 describes procedures for nominal operations, 
including the perspectives of flight operations, the flight deck, and the ANSP.  Sections 6 and 7 
address airspace characteristics and system requirements, respectively.  Section 8 discusses the 
impacts and contingencies of off-nominal conditions.  Section 9 discusses the activities required 
for implementation at a high level, and the document is concluded in Section 10. 
72. Context
AFR operations as described in this document would be performed in airspace currently 
designated as Class A, E and G. While operating in Class B, C or D terminal airspace, aircraft 
could retain their AFR designation and possibly perform certain procedures such as delegated 
separation, but they would communicate with the Tower or Terminal Radar Approach Control 
(TRACON) controller and comply with ANSP instructions, clearances and flow management 
constraints.  Terminal AFR operations would be distinct from en route AFR operations and are 
not described in this document. 
The physical operating environment for AFR operations includes the current NAS and all 
upgrades with NextGen Operational Improvements over the next 15 years. Near the end of this 
period, secondary radar surveillance should have been supplanted in most areas with ADS-B Out 
(i.e., airborne broadcast of surveillance data).  The Global Positioning System (GPS) and its wide 
area and local augmentation services are expected to be the primary source of navigation and 
timing signals by all airspace users.  Alternate means for aircraft positioning, navigation, and 
timing services may also be developed during this period, including possibly local and wide area 
multilateration to provide independent backup surveillance throughout the airspace. TIS-B 
should be available throughout the airspace, using the best available source of surveillance data. 
Communications should be transitioning from primarily Very High Frequency voice radio to 
digital data communications for both routine and flight critical functions, with voice available for 
backup. The ANSP would be providing traditional IFR services to IFR aircraft, and flight 
operational data, including weather data, is expected to be available to all flights through 
government or commercial services.  
AFR may be used by any segment of the flying population, civil or military, commercial or 
private. AFR is designed so that the first equipped and approved operator may use the procedures 
in any of this described airspace. There is no requirement for a minimum percentage of the fleet 
to be equipped before AFR operations commence and benefits begin to accrue.  
Aircraft not operating under AFR will be operating under either IFR or VFR. As NextGen 
emerges, a transition of IFR operations to a concept called Trajectory Based Operations (TBO) is 
expected to take place in which the detailed flight paths of IFR aircraft are negotiated with and 
approved by the ANSP and communicated to and flown by IFR aircraft with precision.  Both 
separation and TFM services provided by the ANSP are being designed to use the more precise 
trajectory data in TBO to improve their efficiency. The AFR concept is consistent with TBO but 
should not require TBO to be in service.  The VFR requirement to “see and avoid” all other 
aircraft when in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) will be continued for all flights, 
regardless of the flight rules under which flights are operating. 
83. Objectives and Anticipated Benefits 
The objective of the AFR concept is to provide an alternative mode of aircraft trajectory-based 
operations that is safe, efficient, flexible, cost effective, and low risk for aircraft operators; that 
minimally subjects AFR aircraft to capacity-driven operational restrictions; and that coexists 
with existing modes of operation without causing disruption of such flights.  Self-separation is 
not the objective of AFR operations; rather, it is the primary enabling capability.  Self-separation 
enables the conduct of operator-managed trajectories in Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
(IMC) or in airspace currently reserved for IFR aircraft.  The objective of the self-separation 
capability is to autonomously accomplish the ATM function of separation for AFR aircraft, 
thereby removing the burden and responsibility of this function from the ANSP.  While AFR 
operations alone will not change the total number of flights in the airspace, the existence of the 
capability will provide a mechanism for significant expansion of en route airspace system 
capacity, which would benefit the ANSP and all airspace users.  Specific benefits sought by the 
implementation of AFR operations are described in the following sections. 
3.1. Improve Safety 
The overall risk of mid-air collision is expected to be reduced by providing lower risk to 
individual flights through their use of self-separation equipment and procedures, and by reducing 
the number of aircraft within the ground-based separation management system. This risk 
reduction is enabled by automatic monitoring of the traffic situation on multiple airborne 
platforms (i.e., the redundancy provided by distribution, with the equipment on two or more AFR 
aircraft monitoring the same encounter) and by locating the entire control loop within the cockpit 
so that control loop time is reduced and vulnerability to air-ground communication failures is 
eliminated. As the ground ATM system becomes responsible for fewer aircraft, the service to 
those remaining aircraft would improve, and the risk of failures would also correspondingly 
decrease. 
3.2. Improve Efficiency and Reduce Delay 
While many IFR aircraft remain subject to that portion of ground delay programs that are related 
to congestion at terminal departure fixes and in en route airspace, AFR aircraft ready for 
departure would be more likely to receive an on-time departure clearance.  The departure 
approval would be enabled by the AFR aircraft assuming the burden for separation responsibility 
from the ANSP shortly after departure and thus not contributing to the ANSP-related 
“congestion” that triggered the ground delay program.  AFR aircraft might similarly be exempt 
from common miles in trail restrictions over IFR departure fixes. 
While en route, AFR flights using self-separation equipment and procedures would be able to 
execute their business trajectories more efficiently because their operation would be independent 
of ANSP constraints driven by the quantity of ground-managed IFR aircraft, such as sector 
loading and balancing and the longer lead times needed to approve requests.  The improved 
flight efficiency would be measurable as reduced block time and fuel burn, as well as improved 
on-time performance. 
AFR operations would have greater throughput in regions of convective weather because 
individual weather rerouting decisions would be made per-aircraft, rather than the “playbook” 
9decisions applied to large groups of aircraft that can significantly impede throughput.  AFR 
consolidates decision-making for traffic separation and weather avoidance decision-making from 
two places (ANSP for traffic, flight deck for weather) to one (flight deck for both), thereby 
allowing more efficient use of the weather-impacted airspace and a greater number of viable 
routing and altitude options.
3.3. Increase Flexibility 
Self-separation is designed to maximize the flexibility afforded to AFR flights by eliminating the 
requirements for ANSP pre-approval of trajectory changes and conformance to most static route 
and airspace constraints.  AFR aircraft could therefore change their trajectory as frequently as 
conditions warrant, without imposing a burden on the ANSP or other aircraft.  This added 
flexibility would also be a major contributor to flight efficiency, being advantageous not only in 
choosing an initial trajectory during flight planning, but also as changing conditions en route 
become apparent to the pilots. For airline and other flights involved in air transportation, these 
includes altered winds, turbulence, actual locations of severe weather, and changing company 
business objectives. Any of these dynamic factors translate to a different optimum flight profile – 
vertically, laterally, and speed toward destination.  The increased flexibility should also be 
beneficial when weather delays are anticipated at the destination airport.  Working with an 
ANSP TFM system, AFR operators would negotiate a scheduled time of arrival consistent with 
other traffic and the latest weather forecast, and they would negotiate a self-selected departure 
time to minimize the probability of en route holding or diversions and thus the excess fuel 
carried onboard for these purposes.  Precision arrival-time capability of AFR aircraft enable the 
flexible en route operations to reliably transition to ANSP control at the arrival fix for the 
remaining arrival portion of the flight. 
3.4. Lower Costs  
AFR equipment costs to users are expected to be more than offset by operational cost savings 
from the increased flight efficiency and flexibility (refs. 12, 13).  Furthermore, these benefits 
would be immediately available to operators upon commencement of AFR operations, a result of 
AFR being a per-aircraft application, i.e., the first aircraft to fly under AFR begins accruing 
benefits on its first flight with no minimum required participation by other aircraft.  Aircraft fleet 
operators could select which aircraft types and routes would benefit the most from AFR and 
thereby reduce total investment costs across the fleet by not having to equip all aircraft and train 
all flight crews for AFR.  The return-on-investment period of AFR capability is anticipated to be 
significantly reduced compared to operational improvements that depend on implementation of 
extensive ground-based infrastructure, a time-consuming process not under aircraft operator 
control.  Once the planned surveillance systems are in place, there would be no need to 
coordinate the implementation timing of airborne equipment purchases with ground system 
operational readiness.  Similarly, future upgrades to AFR capability could be put in service faster 
on a per-aircraft basis than upgrades to extensive ground-based infrastructure, thus accelerating 
the return-on-investment period. 
Much of the equipment required for AFR operations is either in service or emerging 
independently of the AFR concept.  Most airline aircraft are already equipped with Flight 
Management Systems (FMS), multi-function displays, and multi-function control and display 
units (MCDU), and these numbers are rapidly increasing. ADS-B Out-capable aircraft are also 
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increasing rapidly in number, and the current rule requiring this capability by 2020 (ref. 14) will 
ensure eventual ubiquitous coverage of airborne surveillance in the most heavily traveled 
airspace. The marginal cost for ADS-B In, receipt of other's intent data from airborne or ground 
sources, and the flight-deck automation logic for self-separation are expected to be small 
compared to the operational savings.  For many aircraft, ADS-B In equipment and processing 
capability will have already been installed to enable one or more of the many nearer-term ADS-
B applications such as Interval Management (IM) (ref. 15) currently under development. 
Ground system costs should also be positively affected by AFR. Performing separation from the 
ground requires iterative processing of n2 traffic interactions, where "n" is the number of aircraft 
under ground control.  In contrast, the distributed processing enabled by AFR increases linearly 
with increasing numbers of aircraft.  Self-separation could therefore reduce complexity in 
communications and automation systems that robustly handle the n2 problem, especially for an 
order of magnitude increase in traffic as might come from widespread use of UAS, and in local 
regions not well covered with ANSP communications.  It does so by reducing the overall traffic 
growth that must be managed by ground systems.  Since the ground system is experiencing 
frequent saturation today, AFR operations could prevent a further increase in operator and 
system costs associated with travel delays and recovery that would otherwise accrue as traffic 
demand from both manned and unmanned aircraft continues to grow in the future. Ground 
system costs may even decrease, as the number of aircraft remaining in the IFR system 
decreases. 
3.5. Reduce Implementation Risk 
AFR would provide the aforementioned benefits without dependence on government 
implementation of a system-wide, ground-based, automated separation infrastructure, while 
remaining compatible if and when such a system is implemented.  Other than the required policy 
and regulatory changes to establish AFR and the provision of information from government 
sources (e.g., surveillance of non-broadcasting aircraft), the development and implementation 
schedule of AFR is determined by the operator community.  Once the policy and regulatory 
changes are in place, the first aircraft equipped and authorized for AFR may initiate the 
procedure and gain immediate benefits without waiting for a sizable population to equip. These 
factors, which allow earlier yet gradual introduction of AFR operations into the airspace, could 
overcome the most challenging obstacle to achieving NextGen’s anticipated benefits: the 
transition period. 
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4. Autonomous Flight Rules 
This document proposes the creation of a new set of operating regulations, referred to as 
Autonomous Flight Rules (AFR).  AFR would exist alongside IFR and VFR as one of three 
available flight options for any appropriately trained and qualified operator with appropriately 
certified equipment.  Proposing a new set of regulations, rather than integrating the proposed 
capabilities within IFR, is justified by fundamental differences in the methods and 
responsibilities for separation assurance.  Keeping AFR and IFR clearly distinct allows 
continuity of service for the well-established IFR system, while giving regulators and operators 
flexibility in defining the new operations and how they will integrate.  It allows the establishment 
of unique training, equipment, and certification requirements.  Furthermore, it makes clear to 
operators that, by filing an AFR flight plan, they assume the responsibilities therein for that 
entire portion of the flight and will be governed by clearly delineated operating rules.  Operators 
would retain the options of filing IFR or VFR flight plans if either option better suits their 
operation or the needs of the particular flight. IFR and VFR operating requirements would be 
unaffected by the existence of the AFR option. 
The term “autonomous” can be defined as “not subject to control from outside” or 
“independent.”  Even though independent, an autonomous agent is still considered part of the 
community subject to rules and constraints.  The term was chosen for AFR to elevate two 
fundamental principles of the proposed operation: the degree of authority the operator has over 
the trajectory of the aircraft, and the degree of responsibility the operator has to ensure safe 
operations in a traffic environment.  These principles of independence create an important 
balance.  The autonomous authority provides the operator the independence to define and change 
the trajectory without outside (i.e., ANSP) approval, as in VFR, with additional independence 
from VFR meteorological and airspace restrictions.  The autonomous responsibility compels the 
operator to independently ensure (without relying on the ANSP as a ready fallback) that their 
trajectory does not breach established separation criteria from other traffic, a stronger safety 
requirement than VFR’s “see and avoid.”  Thus, AFR represents not a “free for all” but rather a 
structured flight mode with balanced rules and procedures that, while highly flexible, 
methodically ensures separation safety with the utmost integrity. 
There is a close analogy between AFR and VFR that is useful in describing and understanding 
AFR. Both place the responsibility for separation clearly on the pilot of the aircraft operating by 
those rules.  Both relieve the ANSP from separation responsibility.  Both require 
communications with, and participation in, terminal ANSP control services at those airports 
where they are provided.  Just as VFR and IFR operations occur in shared airspace, AFR may 
also be performed in “mixed” operations, in which flights operating by different rules for 
maintaining separation can coexist safely in the same airspace. 
The differences between VFR and AFR are as important as the similarities. VFR flight requires 
staying within certain prescribed weather minima; AFR does not. VFR operations are not 
permitted in Class A airspace, whereas AFR operations are. VFR operations are exempt from 
formal traffic management programs, while AFR flights do participate in them, with special 
rules. VFR flight does not require filing a flight plan. AFR requires an abbreviated plan to 
support TFM predictions and services, as well as search and rescue.  VFR has no quantifiable 
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minimum separation requirement in distance or time (i.e., separation standard).  AFR uses 
quantified standards unless visual acquisition of VFR traffic is achieved.
Additional significant differences between VFR and AFR are evident from the ANSP 
perspective.  VFR aircraft may impede a controller’s flexibility in maneuvering IFR aircraft, 
since the VFR aircraft is only required to provide visual separation from all other aircraft.  AFR 
aircraft maintain proper separation from IFR aircraft and yield right-of-way, and thus they are 
significantly less of an impediment.  VFR flights often request radar traffic advisory services 
from controllers. AFRs will not, as there is no need to. En route VFR flights most often are not in 
communication with the ANSP. AFRs will be on frequency, should the need arise to 
communicate. Actions of VFR aircraft are unpredictable, whereas actions of AFR aircraft will be 
clearly communicated.  In particular, any developing conflicts between AFR and IFR aircraft 
will be identified by the AFR aircraft early and its planned resolution communicated to the 
ANSP well in advance of any apprehension occurring in the controller about the developing 
situation.
The following subsections provide the requirements for each of the following operational 
features of AFR: minimum equipment; pilot qualification, training, and proficiency; applicable 
environment in which AFR operations may be conducted; the requirement to maintain conflict-
free trajectories; the required mechanisms of coordination; and the application of right-of-way. 
4.1. Minimum Equipment 
Aircraft participating in AFR operations will contain the equipment required for flight under IFR 
plus:
 Primary and back-up cooperative airborne surveillance systems approved for AFR use 
 ASAS processor and separation logic 
 ASAS controls, displays, and aural alerting 
 TCAS
 Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) capable of supporting AFR functions 
and ANSP interfacing 
Requirements for these systems are described in Section 7. 
4.2. Pilot Qualification, Training, and Proficiency 
Individual pilots or flight crews operating under AFR must be trained and current in AFR 
procedures and have their certificates endorsed for such operations.  The training requirements 
will be promulgated in FAR Part 61, 135 or 121 appropriate to the operations to be conducted.  
AFR operations will be permissible by single-pilot aircraft and flight-crewed aircraft.  (For 
brevity, the remainder of this document will refer to flight-crewed aircraft.)  Air carrier AFR 
training programs must be approved by the FAA safety oversight office’s Principal Operations 
Inspector of each airline conducting such training.  Following the training, the pilot's ability to 
safely operate under AFR will be confirmed by an appropriately rated check airman.  It is 
expected that AFR proficiency will be maintained using standards similar to the IFR proficiency 
requirements that exist today. 
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4.3. Applicable Environment 
4.3.1. Airspace
AFR operations are performed primarily in en route airspace.  However, an AFR operator may 
fly in any class of airspace in the NAS currently designated as Class A, B, C, D, E or G.  AFR 
capabilities may extend into terminal airspace, but their use will be limited in higher density 
areas.  In Class B airspace, AFR operators, like VFR operators, must obtain and follow an ANSP 
clearance. AFR flights operating in Class C or D terminal airspace will participate in the ground-
based traffic management services of that airspace.  Although terminal airspace may not permit 
full AFR flexibility, delegated separation operations envisioned for NextGen may be facilitated 
by leveraging onboard AFR technologies.
AFR operations have no special ceiling or visibility requirements (i.e., IMC is normal) except 
that they must abide by procedural weather minima such as those on instrument approach 
procedures. They must also operate in VMC wherever the normal and backup sources of 
airborne surveillance are not available. AFR aircraft have no maximum altitude limit.  Although 
adherence to cardinal altitudes and flight levels is not strictly necessary for the technical 
requirements of AFR aircraft, compliance would be recommended to maintain compatibility with 
existing operations.  Compliance to hemispheric rules would not likely be required.  For flights 
at lower altitudes, minimum altitudes employed by AFR aircraft are the same as VFR when 
operating in VMC, and must conform to the IFR minimum sector altitudes or published 
procedural altitudes when in IMC. This ensures both obstacle clearance and communications 
with the ANSP when approaching terminal airspace. 
4.3.2. Mixed operations 
AFR operations are designed to share the airspace with VFR operations and ANSP-controlled 
IFR operations without any segregation.  By extension, they may also readily operate in airspace 
where ANSP services are limited or do not exist.  AFR operations are intended to be compatible 
with a wide range of IFR operational concepts; from current and near-term “manual” air traffic 
control to midterm emergent TBO of NextGen to far-term visions of highly automated airspace.  
As will be discussed in more detail below, this integration is achieved by AFR aircraft yielding 
right-of-way to IFR aircraft. 
4.4. Conflict Free Trajectories 
An AFR aircraft must continuously maintain a conflict-free trajectory through the use of onboard 
ASAS separation functionality, i.e., conflict detection (CD), conflict resolution (CR), and 
conflict prevention (CP) functions as described in the subsections below.  Detailed AFR 
regulations (not within the scope of this document) will define a minimum time horizon along 
the active trajectory (e.g., five minutes) required to be maintained conflict-free (based on 
declared intent of other aircraft, when available, or otherwise on state vectors).  Beyond this time 
horizon, no such requirement will exist.   
4.4.1. Conflict detection and resolution 
The CD function of ASAS will continually monitor the ownship aircraft trajectory and traffic 
environment for potential future Loss of Separation (LOS), as defined by the applicable 
separation standard and some nominal look-ahead horizon (e.g., 10 minutes).  The flight crew 
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relies on the CD function and does not actively monitor for conflicts themselves.  A CD-
predicted LOS within an applicable time horizon will be declared a conflict and annunciated to 
the flight crew.  This applicable time will be a function of the aircraft’s priority in the conflict, or 
“right-of-way.”  Once notified of the conflict, the flight crew will follow defined procedures 
using the ASAS to resolve the conflict in a timely manner. 
When a conflict is declared and annunciated to the flight crew, the CR function of ASAS will 
compute one or more alternative “resolution” trajectories that will not violate the applicable 
separation minima of any aircraft, if possible, within a defined time horizon (e.g., 20 minutes).  
Depending on time criticality, scenario complexity, and crew workload, the specific maneuver to 
resolve a conflict may be presented as the sole option by the ASAS, be chosen by the flight crew 
from among several computed acceptable options, or be designed by the flight crew using the 
ASAS to verify acceptability.  In general, the flight crew selects the resolution that comes closest 
to maintaining the desired business trajectory.  Resolutions may be “strategic” or “tactical.”  A 
strategic resolution is a fully specified “closed loop” reroute to the destination, normally 
executed through an FMS, and shall be the preferred option.  A tactical resolution is an open 
ended (or “open loop”) maneuver with a generally shorter time horizon, analogous to radar 
vectors, that does not specify from the outset the complete trajectory to the destination.  A 
tactical resolution, if determined to be operationally necessary by the flight crew or by the 
ASAS, will require subsequent maneuver decisions for returning to the desired business 
trajectory.  Strategic and tactical resolutions may be accomplished through maneuvering in the 
lateral plane, the vertical plane, through speed adjustment, or any combination of these.  
4.4.2. Conflict prevention 
While operating under AFR in Class A, E, or G airspace, the flight crew is authorized to change 
any aspect of the aircraft’s trajectory (e.g., lateral path, altitude, speed) without requesting or 
receiving approval from the ANSP.  However, any change to the current trajectory must be 
predetermined to be conflict-free to an applicable time horizon in order for the flight crew to be 
authorized to execute the change.  This rule applies to strategic and tactical maneuvers.  The 
flight crew uses the CP function of ASAS to probe desired trajectory changes for “provisional” 
conflicts (i.e., conflicts that would be created by executing the change).  The flight crew is not 
authorized to execute trajectory changes having a provisional conflict within the applicable time 
horizon of the resolution mode (as determined by the predicted first point of LOS).  If such a 
conflict is predicted, the flight crew may consider alternate trajectory changes, postpone and 
recheck the change at a later time, or remain on the current trajectory.  Once a conflict-free 
trajectory change has been identified, the flight crew may execute the change without contacting 
the ANSP or receiving an acknowledgement.  Two automatic transmissions of the new trajectory 
will be immediately initiated by aircraft systems: one broadcast over ADS-B containing near-
term trajectory information and the other directed to the ANSP ground system over CPDLC 
containing more complete information on the trajectory if available.  
4.4.3.  Separation standards 
In the transition to NextGen, it is anticipated that the “one size fits all” separation standard in use 
today for all en route IFR aircraft (i.e., five nautical miles and 1000 feet) will be replaced in the 
future with different standards that are functions of the surveillance information source and the 
performance-based operating capabilities of the aircraft involved.  Accordingly, reduced 
separation standards would exist between AFR aircraft, which would have the best surveillance 
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information and smallest control loop time.  Such standards might be based on both physical 
distance and the Tau criterion, which defines a minimum time to the closest point of approach, to 
ensure the reduced standards remain outside the alerting parameters of TCAS. When in place, 
such reduced standards would reduce the conflict rate at a given traffic density. As more aircraft 
switch to AFR, prevalent use of smaller separation standards and the correspondingly reduced 
conflict rate would dramatically increase overall airspace capacity. 
AFR aircraft, in separating from IFR aircraft, will apply a minimum separation standard 
equivalent to that used by the ANSP in separating IFR aircraft from each other plus likely an 
additional buffer in lateral and vertical dimensions (e.g., an additional two nautical miles and 
1000 feet).  The buffer will be sized to permit the ANSP to maneuver IFR aircraft with minimum 
regard to the presence of AFR aircraft, while also permitting sufficient time and maneuvering 
space for the AFR ASAS equipment and pilot response to preserve the minimum separation 
standard, even under conditions of unanticipated maneuvering by IFR aircraft. Effectively, AFR 
aircraft would generally remain a greater actual and predicted distance from IFR aircraft than is 
required between two IFR aircraft, thus minimizing the impact on strategic or tactical operations 
of the ANSP, a feasibility requirement of mixed AFR and conventional ANSP operations.  In the 
future, as the ANSP implements automation tools for TBO, it may be possible to reduce or 
eliminate the buffers in favor of automated implicit maneuver coordination (discussed below). 
Detailed AFR regulations will define these standards and buffers based on criteria necessary to 
achieve the target levels of safety. The most stringent separation standard that AFR aircraft will 
likely encounter will be for IFR aircraft when radar (provided via TIS-B) is the surveillance 
source, in which case the separation would be increased to account for the radar surveillance 
being less precise than ADS-B. For encounters with VFR aircraft, AFR aircraft will use 
quantified standards until visual acquisition of the traffic is achieved.  The AFR flight crew may 
then maintain visual separation from these aircraft according to standard Visual Flight Rules.     
4.5. Coordination 
In the AFR concept, separation responsibility is distributed among the AFR aircraft in AFR/AFR 
conflicts, and it rests solely with the AFR aircraft in AFR/IFR conflicts.  Safety in a system of 
distributed separation responsibility requires the concept of coordination.  Coordination provides 
assurance that the aircrafts' separate decisions are mutually safe.  Coordination may be explicit,
where mutually safe decisions are communicated and agreed between aircraft, or implicit, where 
means other than communication and agreement are used to ensure mutually safe decisions are 
made.  Other than for collision avoidance, where explicit coordination is used, the AFR concept 
employs implicit coordination to ensure mutually safe decisions are made for primary separation.  
Conceivably, explicit coordination could be applied for primary separation as well; however, this 
would produce costly and unnecessary communication requirements on AFR operations.  Several 
mechanisms of implicit coordination in the AFR concept are described. 
4.5.1. Coordination through intent sharing 
The first mechanism of implicit coordination, which occurs regardless of detected conflicts, is 
the regular broadcast by AFR aircraft of trajectory intent information, i.e., the intended route of 
the aircraft.  While not considered safety critical, sharing this information is intended to promote 
earlier detection of conflicts and more stability in the airspace through fewer trajectory changes.  
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This broadcast is communicated through one or more four-dimensional (4D) Trajectory Change 
Points (TCP) covering the near-term period (e.g., 25 minutes).  The AFR aircraft also implicitly 
coordinates with ground systems by down-linking a more complete trajectory.  Trajectory 
information from IFR aircraft (to the appropriate time horizon) is expected to be made available 
from future ground automation to the AFR aircraft (e.g., via SWIM). By sharing the intended 
near-term trajectory, AFR aircraft implicitly coordinate use of the airspace with other decision-
makers and allow trajectory planning by all to minimize the need for trajectory changes. 
Any change to an AFR aircraft’s trajectory will be broadcast, where possible, before the aircraft 
initiates the turn, climb, or descent.  When executed through the FMS, this procedure is 
accomplished by placing the initial TCP a short time ahead of the aircraft’s current position (e.g., 
one to two minutes).  When an AFR aircraft is operating in a tactical flight mode, the trajectory 
change is broadcast as an immediate target state message, indicating the new target heading or 
target altitude. 
4.5.2. Coordination to avoid conflict creation when one aircraft maneuvers 
The second mechanism of implicit coordination by AFR aircraft is the procedure of preventing 
the generation of new conflicts, out to a specified time horizon, when a trajectory change is 
made.  This mechanism, comparing an intended flight path to the declared intent of other aircraft, 
provides for coordinated use of the airspace and is analogous to “looking both ways before 
crossing the street.”  By ensuring trajectory changes do not create conflict situations that may 
induce another aircraft to maneuver, operations of all aircraft are more efficient and stable. 
4.5.3. Coordination to determine which aircraft should act first to resolve a conflict 
The third mechanism of implicit coordination is the use of priority rules (a.k.a. right-of-way 
rules) which are invoked following the detection of a conflict for which adequate time exists to 
use priority rules (e.g., five or more minutes).  The coordination is implicitly achieved because 
all aircraft will use a common predefined rule set to establish right-of-way.  A high-level 
description of these rules is presented in Section 4.6, “Right of Way.”  The objective of applying 
priority rules is to reduce the occurrence of two aircraft maneuvering simultaneously to resolve 
the same conflict.  In a conflict between two AFR aircraft, the flight crew of the lesser priority 
aircraft will be notified of the conflict first, thereby initiating the procedures onboard that aircraft 
alone for resolving the conflict.  The flight crew of the higher priority aircraft will be notified of 
the conflict, if it still exists, after a short period (e.g., one to three minutes), at which point their 
CR procedures would be initiated.  This approach of staggered alerting times has several 
benefits, including consolidating crew procedures, enabling the use of complex priority rule sets, 
and enhancing safety by automatically calling on the second aircraft’s separation capability 
should some failure disrupt that of the first aircraft.  If inadequate time remains for the use of 
priority rules (i.e., delaying the notification of one aircraft), then both flight crews are equally 
alerted so that they may both act to achieve separation.  This ensures both aircraft do not 
inadvertently hold their course while expecting the other aircraft to maneuver. All resolutions are 
broadcast over ADS-B as trajectory intent information for other AFR aircraft and downlinked to 
the ANSP. 
4.5.4. Coordination to ensure two conflicting aircraft have complementary maneuvers  
The fourth mechanism of implicit coordination is the safety-critical use of maneuver 
coordination and is invoked when the predicted LOS is near in time (e.g., five minutes or less) 
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and both aircraft may be considering maneuvers to provide separation.  It is generally assumed 
that maneuver coordination is applied through the tactical CR logic, although application within 
the strategic CR logic is also possible and may provide efficiency benefits.  Maneuver 
coordination is implicitly achieved by designing the CR logic onboard all aircraft to meet a 
defined set of criteria that is predetermined to ensure any maneuvers by both aircraft will be in 
complementary directions and not self-cancelling (i.e., additive to separation rather than 
subtractive).  The specification and properties of such criteria are formally defined and 
understood today (ref. 16). 
4.5.5. Coordination in mixed operations 
In mixed operations of AFR and IFR aircraft, similar coordination mechanisms could be 
instituted between the two agents responsible for separation, the AFR flight crew and the ANSP.  
However, to enable the earliest implementation of the AFR concept, and to remain compatible 
with a full range of future, emerging IFR concepts, AFR aircraft will initially assume all 
responsibility for separation from IFR aircraft, thus minimizing significant coordination 
requirements and associated burdens on the ANSP in controlling IFR traffic.  Basic ANSP-AFR 
coordination, if needed, will be available immediately using voice communication on the sector 
frequency.  Over time, as the ANSP implements automation tools for controllers, certain 
automated coordination procedures are expected to be developed that may allow reductions in 
the extra separation buffers applied by AFR aircraft for AFR-IFR separation, as described in 
Section 4.4.3.  In addition, adjusting AFR-IFR right-of-way to favor the better-equipped AFR 
aircraft can be considered. 
In addition to yielding right-of-way to IFR aircraft, AFR aircraft will transmit their intended 
trajectory to the ANSP automation system, as well as any real-time changes to it.  Thus, the 
ANSP will have access to the intended path of each AFR aircraft and, workload permitting, can 
provide traffic advisories to IFR or AFR aircraft in accordance with the FAA Air Traffic Control 
handbook  para. 2-1-21 (ref. 17).  In addition, since conflict prevention procedures of AFR 
aircraft do not distinguish between AFR and IFR traffic, AFR aircraft trajectory changes will 
ensure no conflicts with IFR are generated that would induce the ANSP to take action. AFR 
aircraft will resolve all conflicts with IFR aircraft, permitting the ANSP to maintain its 
separation focus primarily on the IFR traffic for which they are responsible.  Although the ANSP 
is not responsible for AFR-IFR separation, the ANSP may also take action to resolve AFR-IFR 
conflicts by moving the IFR aircraft, if desired. 
The primary mechanism the ANSP will use to coordinate with AFR aircraft is the sharing of IFR 
trajectory information.  Specifically, a means will be established through future automation for 
making the active near-term trajectories of each IFR aircraft available to AFR aircraft.  The 
provision would be either through uplink from an information network such as SWIM or through 
a future mandate to include trajectory data in all ADS-B Out broadcasts. The AFR concept 
assumes that the ANSP might need to alter the flight trajectory of an IFR aircraft under their 
control at any time for purposes of separation, to meet a TFM objective, to sequence or space 
aircraft, or for any other safety or efficiency reason.  Because such maneuvers by IFR aircraft 
may not always be pre-announced in the trajectory intent messages, the AFR/IFR minimum 
separation targets in ASAS will include a buffer (as described in Section 4.4.3) to permit the 
AFR to safely react to such IFR maneuvers without a loss of separation.   Only in an emergency 
resulting from total loss of AFR separation capability and threatening a loss of separation with an 
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IFR would the ANSP need to invoke the safety alert provisions of the FAA Air Traffic Control 
handbook  para. 2-1-6 (ref. 17). 
Through voice communication on the sector frequency, the ANSP will have the ability to 
coordinate with AFR pilots directly, should the need arise.  Although ANSP sharing of IFR 
intent information and AFR responsibility for AFR-IFR separation should minimize the need for 
direct coordination, the option will exist to aid situation awareness and operational efficiency.
As the solely responsible party for their own traffic separation, AFR flights do not depend on the 
ANSP to serve as backup for separation while operating under AFR.  The ANSP will bear no 
responsibility for monitoring AFR-AFR or AFR-IFR separation or for intervening, either by 
request or under its own volition, to provide separation in situations where the AFR flight crew is 
responsible.  The ANSP has no intervention authority to cancel an aircraft’s AFR status, just as 
they cannot compel a VFR flight to become IFR.  Thus, an aircraft operator that files an AFR 
flight plan has accepted full responsibility for separation and must meet that responsibility under 
all normal operations.  However, this does not preclude a controller from taking action with an 
IFR aircraft at any time. Contingency procedures for non-normal situations such as AFR 
equipment failure include the ability for the AFR operator to request an in-flight IFR clearance, 
just as an IFR-qualified VFR pilot in an IFR-equipped aircraft can do.  Accommodation of such 
a request would occur, as today, workload permitting, upon which the flight would no longer be 
operating under AFR.  Contingency procedures are addressed in greater detail in Section 8.
Coordination of active maneuvers among AFR aircraft, as described earlier, uses automated 
separation logic in both aircraft to ensure simultaneous maneuvers are complementary and not 
self-cancelling.  Since the AFR concept is designed to be compatible with a range of IFR 
concepts, including current-day operations, maneuver coordination between AFR and IFR may 
not be possible until automation begins to play a more central role in ANSP separation decision-
making.  Once this occurs, safety will be enhanced if the ANSP separation automation tools are 
implemented using the same coordination criteria as ASAS separation automation.   
4.5.6. Explicit coordination for collision avoidance 
In the rare circumstance of failure of this multifaceted system of implicit coordination 
mechanisms, TCAS will be invoked as today to reduce collision risk.  The AFR concept assumes 
TCAS or a replacement collision avoidance system is in place and is explicitly coordinated 
between aircraft, including IFR aircraft.  The separation and collision avoidance systems are 
similar in many ways and should therefore be designed with compatibility in mind.  By having 
both systems onboard, the issues associated with urgent transfer of control authority from the 
controller to the pilot (as in IFR) can be avoided.  As a safety backup system to the onboard 
separation function, TCAS will be implemented with independent hardware and/or partitioned 
software to the extent needed to achieve the target level of safety for collision risk. 
4.6. Right of Way 
Right-of-way is employed in the AFR concept for several reasons: to reduce the occurrence of 
two aircraft simultaneously maneuvering to resolve the same conflict, to reduce the total number 
of trajectory changes occurring in the airspace, to establish some equity among aircraft that 
resolve conflicts, to support the integration of AFR in an ANSP-IFR environment with evolving 
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capabilities, to help maintain the schedules of air carriers, and to give priority to emergency and 
other special-operations aircraft. 
Right-of-way in the AFR concept is implemented through a set of “priority rules” shared and 
applied by all AFR aircraft.  Applying the priority rules between any two aircraft in an encounter 
results in ranking one of the two aircraft as the “priority aircraft” (i.e., higher priority) and the 
other as the “burdened aircraft” (i.e., lower priority).  Rankings of encounters of three or more 
aircraft are performed on a pair-wise basis (i.e., aircraft A vs. aircraft B, B vs. C, and C vs. A).  
Thus, an aircraft could be the priority aircraft in one encounter and simultaneously the burdened 
aircraft in another encounter. Conflict prevention rules apply in carrying out burdened-aircraft
responsibilities, and thus a resolution of one conflict should resolve all existing conflicts for that 
aircraft.   
In the AFR concept, the priority ranking determines the conflict notification timing for the flight 
crew and thus when the CR procedures are initiated.  In general, the flight crew of the burdened 
aircraft is notified first, and the flight crew of the priority aircraft is notified after a short period if 
the conflict still exists.  The flight crew bears no responsibility in determining the priority 
ranking because the rule set is explicitly defined and evaluated automatically within the ASAS of 
each AFR aircraft.  This approach provides the advantage of allowing the use of complex rule 
sets that consider many factors beyond the relatively simple geometric factors in VFR and 
maritime encounters.  It also reduces the potential for disparate interpretation between the two 
flight crews that may lead to hazardous situations where both crews believe they have priority in 
the encounter. 
4.6.1. Factors in determining priority 
Detailed AFR regulations will establish the precise definition of the priority rules, but multiple 
factors are expected to play a role in the ultimate determination of priority.  In order of relative 
precedence, these factors include emergency status, flight rules, arrival constraints, and 
encounter geometry. If other priority considerations such as "Best Equipped Best Served" are 
implemented, it could cause the priorities listed below to be re-visited. 
Emergency status
Any aircraft in emergency status (or otherwise designated as a special operation) will have 
priority over an aircraft not in emergency status. 
Flight rule status 
In encounters between AFR and IFR aircraft, the IFR aircraft will have priority over an AFR 
aircraft, except where the Emergency Status rule applies.  This is done so that there is no burden 
on the ANSP to provide right-of-way to an AFR aircraft by altering the path of an IFR aircraft 
they are controlling.  AFR aircraft will be displayed to controllers with their flight rule status in 
the aircraft data tag.  A controller may, as an additional duty, time permitting, issue a traffic 
advisory to an IFR or AFR aircraft in the same manner as he would point out a proximate VFR 
or other IFR aircraft.
This right-of-way rule is considered critical to enabling mixed AFR-IFR operations in 
environments where controllers are not supported by automation tools for conflict management.  
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As automation tools are introduced, rebalancing of right-of-way in favor of the better-equipped 
AFR aircraft can be considered.  Meanwhile, the ANSP is not prohibited from maneuvering the 
IFR aircraft should it be desired.
AFR-VFR encounters will be governed by standard Visual Flight Rules, as are IFR-VFR 
encounters.  As always, each pilot must see and avoid all other aircraft in VMC. 
Arrival constraint 
An AFR aircraft with a near-term arrival constraint may be given priority over an AFR aircraft 
without a near-term arrival constraint, except where the previously mentioned rules take 
precedence.  Examples of arrival constraints are a Required Time of Arrival (RTA) at the arrival 
metering fix and an IM clearance for airborne spacing to the runway (which may commence in 
en route airspace).  
Research has not yet suggested the need for this rule, the time horizon over which it would 
apply, or the source of the required information.  The rule is included here as a conceptual 
placeholder. 
Encounter geometry 
In encounters between two AFR aircraft where priority has not been determined by the preceding 
rules, the geometry of the encounter will be used to determine priority.  The VFR rule set 
governing right-of-way in various geometric encounters should be the starting point for the 
corresponding AFR rule set, the objective being to maintain compatibility with visual separation 
rules that would be applied by all aircraft in visual conditions.  More importantly, however, this 
rule set should be comprehensive in its coverage of encounter geometries, including vertical 
segments of the trajectories of the subject and traffic aircraft.  Current VFR rules are not explicit 
enough to serve as a complete model.  The rule set must cover all possible geometries and have 
no gaps or singularities.  Departure from the VFR example may be necessary to accomplish this 
requirement.
4.6.2. Additional requirements for priority determination 
The right-of-way rule set and its implementation should have the following additional 
characteristics and properties. 
Restricted to data available from surveillance sources 
Information on traffic aircraft for priority determination will be limited to that which is available 
over ADS-B or TIS-B.  The rule set must work within this restriction.  If additional information 
is determined to be necessary, this may require modification to the ADS-B minimum required 
message set, TIS-B content to be enhanced, or an alternative uplink by the ANSP of the required 
information. 
Asymmetric and coordinated 
The rule set should produce a rank ordering and generally avoid declaring a tie, i.e., equal 
priority.  Ideally, applying the rule set from either aircraft should produce the same ranking 
result.  However, a conservative implementation may allow for equal priority in boundary cases 
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(i.e., where uncertainty effects prevail), provided that both aircraft consider themselves the 
burdened aircraft.  To be avoided are situations in which both aircraft assume they have the 
right-of-way.
Stable in the presence of uncertainty 
Where the inputs to the rule set may fluctuate due to measurement uncertainties or environmental 
variations, the output should be reasonably stable, i.e., the ranking should not continually flip.  In 
addition, the rule set should use the most stable information available as input and minimize 
reliance on predictions subject to significant errors or uncertainties.
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5. Procedure Description 
5.1. Flight Operations Procedures 
AFR may be conducted by any civil or military aircraft in the NAS. This section outlines AFR-
related procedures envisioned for fleet operators that have operational support from their own 
ground-based facilities.  Procedures envisioned for non-fleet operators are addressed at the end 
of this section. 
5.1.1. AFR Fleet Management 
AFR equipment installations would be prioritized by fleet type, starting with the fleet that could 
derive the greatest benefit from AFR procedures.  From a maintenance standpoint, the individual 
tail numbers of aircraft are already tracked to ensure the proper inspections are performed and 
spares are on hand. In any fleet at any time, there are wide differences among the aircraft as 
modifications and upgrades to many systems are installed during the regular maintenance 
downtime schedule.  Retrofitting an aircraft with AFR capability would be worked into this 
schedule.
Aircraft fleet routing at airlines is planned in a strategic sense typically a month in advance of the 
schedule being flown to accommodate both anticipated loads and scheduled maintenance visits.  
On the day of operation, equipment substitutions (if needed) are made in the same aircraft type, 
if available.  The aircraft routers would schedule the AFR aircraft on the routes that would 
provide the greatest return on investment. These would generally be the routes most constrained 
under IFR, i.e., in regions with the higher traffic densities. 
For any given city pair, an AFR aircraft may have a somewhat lower flight time and fuel burn 
than the same type of aircraft operating under IFR. This time difference may be most apparent on 
shorter flights where the IFR penalties are greater. Keeping AFR aircraft only on particular 
routes may prove difficult and/or inefficient to integrate within existing route schedules while 
their numbers are few among the airline's fleet.  Therefore, it is likely that airline schedules will 
change in a way that maximizes the AFR flight time benefit only after a substantial portion of 
any single fleet type is equipped. At lower AFR equipage levels, shorter fleet-wide flight times 
and improved on-time performance may still result, although not to their maximum extent.  
5.1.2. AFR Flight Planning 
All of the current procedures and requirements for safety and operational integrity of the fleet 
operator would be used in planning AFR flights, just as they are for IFR flights.  The biggest 
difference in planning an AFR flight would be in the available choices for the flight trajectory. 
The operator’s business needs are the basis of the flight plan.  Finding the least-cost flight 
trajectory that meets the constraints of safety and security is the job of flight-planning software at 
nearly all major carriers today, and the sophistication of these systems will increase dramatically 
as restrictions to operation in the airspace are removed by operating under AFR. 4D flight 
planning is designed to optimize the earnings contribution of each individual flight in an airline’s 
schedule. Earnings contribution is the revenue generated by the flight minus the cost of operating 
it.  While passenger revenue is well determined just before departure time, cargo revenue often is 
not, being subject to the load-carrying capability of the aircraft.  If an AFR aircraft is assigned to 
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the flight, additional payload may be carried, as the fuel load will reflect a lower “burn out” 
along the trajectory and may also have lower required reserves.  Making passenger connections, 
especially to flights that only operate once daily or less, has both revenue and cost implications.  
Spilling a passenger to a competitor’s flight means lost revenue.  Putting passengers up for the 
night and feeding them adds to cost.  All of these factors are considered simultaneously when 
planning the flight trajectory, including aircraft speed along the chosen vertical and lateral path.  
AFR capability should enable greater optimization of flight operations with respect to achieving 
a fleet operator’s business and customer service objectives. 
There is not yet one “best” implementation of such a flight-planning system and the degree to 
which a particular airline has been able to optimize this function is a major competitive 
discriminator. Adding AFR aircraft to the mix provides even more opportunity for flight-
planning sophistication. Removing restrictions to the flight can simplify some aspects of the 
planning process but since many flight-planning systems have the current ANSP constraints built 
into them, removing those constraints will lead to more flexible trajectory optimization 
algorithms.  The flight-planning system will take into account the added flexibility of AFR 
operations, as well as the availability of AFR aircraft in the fleet, in solving this complex 
optimization problem. 
5.1.3. En route replanning and flight deck coordination 
The flight plan created prior to departure is the basis for the final fuel load and the planned 
payload at departure.  Once underway, many of the parameters used in the original plan change, 
including things of interest only to the operator.  Therefore, the 4D flight planning system 
continues to run new plans (called forward flight plans) periodically from an airborne aircraft’s 
current location to its destination, using the altered input parameters.  These plans may result in 
changes to the lateral path flown, the vertical flight profiles used, and airspeed flown along track, 
any of which may or may not change the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) at the destination.  
The ability to fly AFR would maximize the ability to exercise this flexibility because ANSP 
approval for changes is not required and therefore the type, scope, and frequency of changes are 
not limited. 
Ad hoc changes to the original plan may originate either with the dispatch function or in the 
cockpit, but all such changes are vetted by the flight crew prior to execution.  In performing 
forward flight planning, not only the expected external influences are considered, such as SUA 
status, actual and updated forecast winds, turbulence, and the actual existence and location of 
thunderstorm cells, but also the internal factors such as measured fuel compared to planned fuel 
at waypoints, status of other flights to which connections are to be made, and actual gross weight 
which determines altitude capability and other performance parameters.  Additional requirements 
related to the condition of passengers on board, though less frequent, create other common 
perturbations to the original plan. The flexibility of AFR to immediately accommodate these 
changes, as well as things only visible to the flight crew, makes it cost effective for operators to 
invest in the development of sophisticated “contribution optimization” algorithms in their flight-
planning systems.   
5.1.4. Flight restrictions monitoring and preemptive decision-making 
The airline flight dispatch function keeps track of SUA status and congestion at the airports and 
in the airspace. This information can be immediately used by AFR aircraft to alter their 
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trajectories and avoid unnecessary maneuvering and inefficiency while flying through these 
areas. There is no need for them to pre-coordinate such decisions with the ANSP before taking 
action. Similar efficiencies result when SUA is opened up to civil flights, the acceptance rate of 
an airport changes unexpectedly, or convective weather fails to materialize or shows up where 
not expected. The AFR flight crew can immediately make a route, altitude, or speed change and 
then request an updated flight plan from flight dispatch to reflect the new reality the remainder of 
the way to destination. 
5.1.5. ANSP coordination for arrival scheduling 
An AFR flight that is planned to a capacity-constrained airport will provide to the ANSP the 
ETA at that airport prior to its push-back from the departure gate, followed by regular en route 
updates. This information is used by the ANSP in any traffic management initiative to be 
imposed on all flights to balance capacity and demand. "Best Equipped Best Served" may 
qualify AFR flights for priority in the altered arrival schedule. Any required alteration to the 
ETA would be issued by the ANSP as an RTA and sent to both the dispatch function and the 
flight crew. To comply with a delayed arrival time, the operator may elect to delay the AFR 
flight at the gate, on the ground away from the gate, or in the air. 
Once in the air, changes to the arrival schedule will be used by the dispatcher in forward flight 
planning and executed by the flight crew to take advantage of available airport capacity as a part 
of the dynamic optimization of all the fleet operator’s flights. 
5.1.6. Procedures for Non-Fleet Operators 
Many General Aviation (GA) operators do not have their own ground support facilities for 
information gathering, flight planning, and en route flight plan updating. Rather, they rely on 
either government or private services for these needs. For non-fleet operators, AFR flight 
planning is conducted similar to IFR flight planning for flights to other airports, or similar to 
VFR flight planning for local flights where the origin and destination are the same airport (e.g., 
flight training). Takeoff, approach, and landing clearances would be requested from the 
appropriate ANSP facility, where these airport services are provided, and the departure and 
arrival would be performed in accordance with the issued clearance. While en route, information 
is expected to be available through authorized aircraft access to the SWIM database of current 
airport and NAS information, including weather data. 
5.1.7. Flight Plan Filing 
All AFR flights would file AFR flight plans with the ANSP. For flights to distant airports, the 
AFR flight plan would indicate the initially planned trajectory (route, speed, and altitude) to 
support ANSP awareness of aggregate AFR operations in the airspace as well as search and 
rescue requirements.  The filed route would include at least one waypoint for each crossing of an 
Air Route Traffic Control Center boundary.  For flights conducted entirely within a single 
Center, a route specification would not be required, and the ANSP would assume a direct route 
between airports.  For local flights, the route may simply indicate “AFR local.”   
The ground automation would assign a transponder code so that the AFR status of the flight 
would be known to the ANSP and to other aircraft throughout the flight. Where IFR handling is 
specifically desired at the origin or destination airports, the option would exist to file a composite 
flight plan that specifies AFR for the en route segment and IFR for the departure and/or arrival 
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segments.  Similar to VFR-IFR composite flight plans, the AFR-IFR composite flight plan would 
specify the AFR-to-IFR transition fix and ETA.  With this information, the ANSP would have an 
IFR clearance ready for the aircraft upon its reaching the arrival transition fix, and the remainder 
of the flight would be planned and conducted as an IFR flight.  Some terminal airspace with 
complex operations (e.g., Class B) may require such composite flight plans under certain 
conditions, e.g., when IMC is forecasted.
5.2. Flight Deck Procedures 
The procedures used by flight crews operating under AFR are considerably more proactive than 
under IFR because so much more freedom of action is available to them. The flight crew will be 
continually involved in assessing changing conditions both on and off the aircraft and 
participating in the determination of the future flight path to maintain safety from all hazards and 
to optimize their own flight's performance in the business sense. 
5.2.1. Transitioning from IFR to AFR 
Wherever the ANSP provides an airport control service, AFR aircraft are required to participate 
in that service and conform to any ANSP-issued clearances, the same as any other VFR or IFR 
aircraft.  AFR aircraft on the airport surface operate under ANSP Ground Control and will 
comply with ground control instructions. The ANSP will also provide the takeoff clearance to 
AFR flights as it does to all others, usually with an initial heading and altitude or departure 
procedure, including noise abatement procedures.  For AFR departures from airports within 
Class B or C airspace, the flight may initially operate as an IFR departure.  After takeoff, a 
handoff will be made from tower to departure control. When the aircraft is initially clear of other 
traffic, the ANSP may clear the aircraft to “proceed under AFR”. Taking off from an airport in 
Class D airspace will only involve the tower for the taxi and takeoff clearance. At non-towered 
airports in Class E and G airspace, the AFR flight will use surface applications of ADS-B from 
the beginning of taxi and self-separation capabilities starting at takeoff. 
While operating under IFR, the flight crew may be permitted to operate the ASAS equipment 
from the beginning of taxi throughout the takeoff and departure.  However, ASAS use will be 
restricted to other approved ADS-B applications separate from AFR, such as surface alerting or 
departure IM procedures.
When the flight crew is informed to "proceed under AFR", the clearance is acknowledged, and 
the flight guidance is engaged to the business trajectory that is loaded in the navigation system, 
commencing AFR operations and continual flight optimization.  
5.2.2. En Route operations 
AFR operations will typically commence while the aircraft is climbing to its initial cruise 
altitude.  Once released by the ANSP, the climb profile will not be subject to institutionalized 
altitude level-off restrictions prior to reaching the cruise altitude.  The procedures during climb 
and cruise are the same; the flight crew monitors the progress along the business trajectory and 
performs other normal piloting tasks.  Although positions of nearby traffic will be shown on a 
display, the flight crew is not required to monitor the display or to scan for potential conflicts.  
The CD function is performed entirely by the ASAS automation, and the flight crew will be 
notified if a conflict is detected that requires a pilot response.  In such events, the pilot will be 
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provided with flight guidance to maintain separation, which must be followed, just as an ATC 
clearance for IFR aircraft.   
While en route, the flight crew maintains a listening watch on the voice frequency for the ANSP 
sector being traversed, that frequency being continuously updated during the flight. The voice 
frequency is guarded for potential use in emergency situations, enabling communications with 
the ANSP or other nearby flights.  Normal operations will generally not require voice 
communication with the ANSP, including transfer of communication, which is expected to be 
transitioned to CPDLC in the coming years.  Voice communications will also provide the option 
for the ANSP to coordinate directly with the AFR pilot to aid situation awareness and 
operational efficiency, although such coordination is expected to be infrequent.
The majority of the flight will generally be conducted in a strategic autoflight mode, with the 
autoflight system coupled to the FMS (if available) or by a pilot following the flight director that 
conforms to the desired business trajectory.  The flight crew also has the option to fly in tactical 
flight modes if the conditions dictate, such as when navigating in and around convective weather. 
The near-term portion of the active trajectory is automatically and repeatedly broadcast over 
ADS-B without pilot involvement, thereby promoting shared awareness of the aircraft’s intended 
path.   When on an active FMS route, a more complete trajectory is also maintained current with 
the ANSP through automated CPDLC downlink.  The ETA at the destination will be continually 
updated as conditions change en route for use in ANSP traffic management algorithms. 
The flight crew monitors the conditions of the flight (e.g., weather, turbulence, and fuel state) 
and periodically reassesses the conditions to ensure the business trajectory remains optimal.  If 
the flight has been assigned an RTA by the ANSP, the flight crew monitors progress towards the 
RTA waypoint.  RTA assignments will have either a standard or specified tolerance, and onboard 
systems will aid the flight crew in monitoring conformance.  The flight crew will adjust the 
trajectory as needed to maintain conformance, or if unable to meet the assigned time, they will 
contact the ANSP and coordinate a revised assignment. 
5.2.3. Conflict management 
During AFR flight, the onboard ASAS automatically and continually probes the active trajectory 
for conflicts with other aircraft trajectories, using surveillance and trajectory information 
received automatically from the other aircraft or ground systems.  From the flight crew 
perspective, this process occurs in the background and the flight crew will only be notified if a 
conflict is detected and a pilot response is required.  Depending on its design, the ASAS may 
provide manual tools that the flight crew could use to monitor traffic encounters on the traffic 
display.  However, only active conflicts indicated by the ASAS alert system would require the 
flight crew to respond with a trajectory change.  Preemptive and speculative adjustments of the 
trajectory by the flight crew to avert potential conflicts would generally be counterproductive 
and are discouraged, although not prohibited.  Any such pilot-initiated adjustments would have 
to follow procedures for conflict prevention, described next in Section 5.2.4. 
The ASAS will notify the flight crew of an actionable conflict by both visual and aural 
indications.  If a multi-level alert system is used, the visual and aural indications will reflect the 
urgency for flight crew response.  Although detailed procedures will be somewhat dependent on 
a particular ASAS design, the general flight crew procedure for non-urgent conflicts would begin 
with acquiring awareness of the particular conflict situation indicated by ASAS, including the 
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conflicting aircraft’s relative position, altitude, direction of flight, and location of the predicted 
LOS.  Although developing this awareness is not required to resolve the conflict, it would be 
considered good safety practice, similar to a controller pointing out traffic under VFR Flight 
Following.  For urgent conflicts, this step could be skipped.  In most implementations, an ASAS 
conflict alert is the flight crew’s indication that a trajectory change will be required.  The flight 
crew will not be required to decide whether a resolution maneuver is needed, as this would 
inhibit the built-in coordination mechanisms described in Section 4.5. 
To resolve an indicated conflict, the flight crew must use the ASAS to determine the maneuver, 
as it is the only mechanism for ensuring that the trajectory change will resolve the conflict and 
not create new conflicts.  The ASAS CR function may compute several acceptable trajectory-
change solutions for pilot selection, but it will always provide at least one solution (a likely 
certification requirement).  In all but the rarest situations, the solutions provided by ASAS will 
be conflict-free all the way to the chosen time horizon.  (Rare situations in which no conflict-free 
maneuvers exist, which can also occur today, would still result in ASAS-generated maneuvers 
that prevent LOS, if possible, or minimize the hazard, if a LOS is inevitable.)  In typical 
installations, the CR solutions will be displayed on the Navigation Display (ND), Primary Flight 
Display (PFD), other dedicated display, and/or the MCDU.  The CR solutions may be strategic 
(i.e., executable as a modified FMS route or altitude) or tactical (i.e., executed by direct pilot 
control of the autoflight settings or manual flight controls).   In general, tactical resolutions will 
be used when the time-to-LOS is within a few minutes, because they can typically be executed 
more quickly.
The flight crew must make a trajectory change that is consistent with ASAS guidance.  In most 
situations, the flight crew will simply execute one of the supplied maneuver options.  In some 
situations, the pilot could modify the maneuver to suit crew preferences, for instance to climb 
2000 feet rather than the 1000 feet indicated by the ASAS CR.  However, such modifications 
must conform to the conflict prevention procedures discussed next in Section 5.2.4.  Since 
information on convective weather and SUA (i.e., area hazards) will likely be available in digital 
form on the flight deck, most ASAS installations will typically ingest and take this information 
into account when producing CR guidance.  ASAS will be designed to keep the aircraft separated 
from both traffic and airspace hazards and will apply appropriate priorities between them.  
Generally, area hazard definitions will include sufficient safety buffers to allow temporary 
latitude in resolving traffic conflicts in the vicinity of the area hazard.  As today, the flight crew 
will use experience and judgment to complement policy when determining safe distances from 
weather hazards. 
Most conflict resolutions will be of the strategic type, meaning the maneuver is fully executed 
through one update of the FMS active route.  In such situations, no further flight crew action is 
required.  The flight crew may choose to monitor the closest point of approach of the previously 
conflicting aircraft, although it is not required.  If the flight crew switched to a tactical flight 
mode, for instance in response to a tactical CR, they may continue indefinitely in the tactical 
flight mode or, preferably, return to the lower-workload strategic mode following appropriate CP 
procedures.
28
5.2.4. Conflict prevention 
While en route, AFR flight crews may have reason to modify the aircraft’s trajectory for 
purposes other than to resolve a conflict.  The change may be a complete re-plan of the business 
trajectory in response to, for example, an updated wind forecast or changed arrival priority.  It 
could be a re-optimization of the cruise altitude for improved ride quality or fuel efficiency.  Or 
it could be a temporary deviation to navigate around a weather cell.  Whatever the reason for the 
change, the flight crew must follow conflict prevention procedures to ensure the trajectory 
change does not create a conflict.
The universal CP procedure for verifying acceptability of a specific desired change is to enter the 
intended maneuver into the ASAS so that it can probe the maneuver for conflicts.  The specific 
method for entering the maneuver will be dependent on the particular ASAS design and 
installation.  The ASAS CP function will accommodate both strategic and tactical provisional 
trajectories.  For most integrated avionics installations, the flight crew will be able to preselect 
the maneuver in the autoflight system.  Provisional strategic maneuvers will generally be entered 
by creating an FMS “mod” route.  Provisional tactical maneuvers will generally be entered 
through flight control presets.  Prior to execution of either type, ASAS will probe the maneuver.  
If no provisional conflict is indicated, the flight crew may execute the maneuver.   
Other CP functionality may include an “at a glance” display of conflicted maneuvers (or 
alternatively, conflict-free maneuvers).  Using this capability, the flight crew could see, for 
example, that tactical turns to the left are available but turns to the right are not.  This 
information could aid in situation awareness and advance maneuver planning, but the procedure 
above will still be required prior to any specific maneuver. 
5.2.5. Transitioning from AFR to IFR 
If the destination airport has ANSP-provided terminal services, AFR flights must participate in 
those services.  If the ANSP terminal automation provides a metering list used by controllers, the 
AFR aircraft will provide an ETA at the metering fix in order to facilitate the merge with other 
traffic at the arrival airport.  If the ETA must be adjusted to meet flow management constraints, 
such adjustment will take the form of an RTA issued to the AFR flight.  At airports where 
automated arrival fix metering for all flights is not implemented, AFR flights will arrive at the 
terminal airspace boundary at a separate designated fix, when justified by traffic volume, to pick 
up their ATC instruction (usually a heading and an altitude) and will follow radar vector 
procedures to the final approach course, the same as IFR flights.  Alternatively, the flight crew 
may pick up an actual IFR clearance upon entering terminal airspace and proceed under IFR.  
AFR aircraft arriving at airports within Class C or D airspace in VMC must follow the same 
requirements as VFR arrivals for contacting the tower.  When the weather is IMC, ANSP 
approval must be received before entering the airspace. The AFR flight plan filed before flight 
will be on file at the destination airport, and thus the ANSP will be expecting the flight’s arrival, 
have a flight strip on it, and have an IFR clearance ready for issuance at the specified transition 
fix.  Flights by AFR aircraft to and from uncontrolled airports located within Class E or G 
airspace may be made without any contact with the ANSP in VMC.  Use of AFR procedures at 
these airports in IMC requires TIS-B coverage or the ADS-B Out requirement for all aircraft 
operating at the airport in IMC. 
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The specific procedures used by an AFR flight arriving at the terminal boundary depend on the 
state of implementation of NextGen automation for the time period in question. Three 
subsequent time periods are illustrated here, by way of example. 
Current – In today's system, the flight crew of the AFR flight calls the TRACON prior to 
entering the terminal area, whose lateral and vertical boundaries are shown on the map display. 
The approach controller responds, verifies identity, and declares "radar contact." From that point 
on, the AFR flight is treated like an IFR aircraft, including issuance of clearances for charted 
procedures, vectoring, and speed control all the way to the runway. At high-traffic airports, dual 
fixes at the arrival corner posts will provide for initial separation of AFR and IFR flights during 
the transition to terminal IFR procedures. The AFR flights would proceed inbound from their 
arrival fix at an ANSP-assigned altitude and on a heading parallel to the traffic crossing the IFR 
fix. Subsequent radar vectors would be used to merge the AFR and IFR aircraft to the 
appropriate final approach course. It is important to note that the existence of AFR will not, in 
itself, cause any change in the total volume of traffic. AFR flights would otherwise have been 
IFR or VFR flights already using the airport, and the total traffic handled will not change. 
Midterm – In the mid-term, data communications will be in use domestically, and the re-
establishment of ANSP control will take place through that medium. Optimum Profile Descents 
(OPD) may be in use at the airport along with IM operations.  Both of these procedures are 
coordinated through the ground-based ANSP so the transition from AFR to IFR may take place 
near the Top of Descent with the issuance of a clearance to perform the OPD and IM, along with 
an RTA (if required) and the landing sequence in the form of the identity of the aircraft to 
follow. There will be a mix of capabilities in this time frame, and the ANSP will be using 
vectoring and speed control to assist the merge for some aircraft and to maintain their proper 
spacing on final. 
Far term – In the far term, the merge for each runway will be performed using a time rather than 
distance interval until short final where aircraft using the same runway will interleave for 
landing. The ANSP automation will still assign the landing sequence in response to the ETAs 
given by all incoming aircraft, but AFR flights will be able to maintain AFR status all the way to 
the runway. Their OPD will be ad hoc, conforming to their business trajectory while separation 
responsibility is continued. The IM function will be performed as a timing tool, perhaps to 
follow an aircraft approaching the runway from the opposite direction. Spacing on short final is 
also an airborne function performed without ANSP assistance. There will always be a mix of 
airborne capabilities in the airspace, but manual control by the ANSP should be the exception. 
5.3. ANSP Procedures 
During the transition to NextGen, the ANSP procedures used by human controllers will evolve 
as additional decision support tools are implemented in the ATC facilities. Many of the 
procedures used to control IFR and VFR aircraft in various portions of the airspace will change 
with the introduction of TBO and ANSP data communications.  However, by design, almost no 
new procedures are required to accommodate AFR flights in the en route airspace.  
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5.3.1. Releasing flights to AFR 
AFR flights are identified to the ANSP as such in the initial flight plan and on the flight strips 
used by airport and terminal area controllers. These flights are treated like any other IFR 
departure until after takeoff, when the departure controller hands off separation responsibility to 
the flight crew. This handoff occurs when the AFR flight is not in a current or imminent conflict 
situation with any other IFR flight. The phraseology might be, "Transcon 123, radar service is 
terminated, proceed under AFR".  The ANSP must receive pilot acknowledgement for the 
handoff to be complete. 
5.3.2. Managing IFR flights in mixed IFR/AFR airspace 
Normal control of en route IFR flights continues with minimum regard given to the presence of 
AFR flights. Any exceptions are considered non-normal operations and are discussed in Section 
8. The ANSP has no separation or trajectory management responsibility for AFR flights from the 
time they are released to AFR until re-established on an IFR clearance, normally in the vicinity 
of the destination terminal airspace. AFR flights will still be displayed on the controller's display 
but, at the controller's discretion, may have reduced or suppressed data tags, similar to VFR 
flights in certain airspace. ASAS separation logic is designed to detect and resolve conflicts 
between AFR aircraft and ANSP-managed IFR aircraft in a timely fashion to preclude controller 
concern about whether the AFR flight is going to resolve the conflict or how it will be resolved.  
A concerned controller may always take action by maneuvering the IFR aircraft.  Normal ANSP 
procedures of not creating a known hazard apply.  In addition, contacting AFR pilots on the 
voice frequency is available to aid situation awareness and operational efficiency.  In normal 
operations, voice communication between en route controllers and AFR pilots should not be 
frequently required. 
5.3.3. TFM and AFR 
Traffic management initiatives will be coordinated with both the operator’s flight operations 
center (if applicable) and the aircraft involved. If necessary, flight dispatch would reissue flight 
plans taking the traffic management constraints into account. Two common constraints that may 
be imposed on AFR operations are an RTA at a geographic point or, alternatively, an IM 
clearance to perform airborne spacing on a lead aircraft in the arrival flow.   
The RTA could be assigned to meet a TFM objective at a busy destination airport to limit the 
arrival rate.  It might also be used to facilitate an AFR flight's resumption of ANSP-managed 
control (either transition to IFR or issuance of ATC vectors) at a terminal airspace entry point.  
When an RTA exists, it is included as a constraint in the AFR aircraft’s strategic CR function of 
the ASAS.  In these instances, separation is maintained while still complying with the active 
RTA.  If for any operational reason it becomes unsafe, impractical, or impossible to meet an 
RTA, the cockpit automation systems (FMS and/or ASAS) advise the flight crew of this, along 
with a new time window that can be met.  This time window would be sent to the ANSP as the 
opening request in a computer negotiation for a revised RTA. The revised RTA from the ANSP 
would be acknowledged and met by the AFR flight. 
IM procedures would typically be used as a TFM initiative to maximize arrival throughput.  IM 
uses airborne spacing capability to achieve precise intervals between aircraft at the merge point 
or runway.  Because the procedure may start prior to the aircraft’s Top of Descent, integrating 
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the AFR and IM concepts will need to be considered.  Integration of these concepts is considered 
feasible, but further research is required to develop a detailed description. 
When traffic management initiatives are not in effect, the ANSP would use the aircraft’s ETA at 
the transfer point for arrival planning.  The ETA would automatically be provided from the FMS 
by data link or advised by the flight crew by voice, and it would not constitute a constraint on the 
business trajectory.  If an RTA or IM procedure is required for congestion or merging with other 
traffic, the ground scheduler would use the ETA to optimize the arrival sequence and minimize 
delay.
5.3.4. Transitioning from AFR to IFR 
If the destination airport has ANSP-provided airport services, AFR flights must check in with the 
ANSP and receive a clearance prior to entering Class B, C, or D airspace. The procedural nature 
of this transfer of control depends on the degree of implementation of NextGen capabilities.  If 
the ANSP terminal automation provides a metering list used by controllers, the AFR aircraft will 
provide an ETA at the metering fix in order to facilitate the sequencing of traffic at the arrival 
airport.  In the near term, the ETA would be sent by voice transmission to a controller.  If the 
ETA must be adjusted to meet flow management constraints, such adjustment will likely take the 
form of an RTA issued by the controller to the AFR flight.  In the midterm, this merge time 
negotiation will be performed using data communications, and RTA or IM procedures may be 
used.  In the far term, the ETA transfer should be an automated airborne to ground system 
communication, and extensive use of RTA and IM procedures should be the norm.  AFR aircraft 
arriving at airports within Class C or D airspace must follow the same requirements as VFR 
arrivals for contacting the TRACON and tower and for complying with any issued clearances. 
Flights by AFR aircraft to and from uncontrolled airports located within Class E or G airspace 
may be made without any contact with the ANSP in VMC. Use of AFR procedures for these 
airports in IMC requires TIS-B coverage or the ADS-B Out requirement for all aircraft using the 
airport in IMC. 
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6. Airspace Characteristics 
The airspace structure of the NAS need not be altered for the introduction of AFR operations.  
The existing airspace classification scheme, in which the U.S. employs Classes A, B, C, D, E and 
G, could continue, with AFR operations being permitted in A, E and G airspace without 
participation in the ground-based ANSP separation function.  Operations in terminal airspace 
classified as B, C, or D would require participation in the ANSP ATM system through 
compliance with any issued ANSP clearances.  Separation responsibility may be delegated to the 
flight crew by the ANSP within terminal airspace as described in NextGen documentation, but 
absent such delegation, the responsibility rests with the ANSP for both AFR-AFR and AFR-IFR 
interactions.  AFR capabilities could act as a backup safety system for all encounters, including 
those with VFR traffic. 
6.1. Airspace and Route Structures 
AFR operations are conducted independently of airspace structure, except for the terminal 
airspace boundaries governing transition to and from ANSP-managed operations.  ANSP facility 
airspace boundaries and inter-facility control sector boundaries may be retained or modified 
without impact on AFR flight, as they pose no restriction on AFR trajectories.  Where more 
flights elect to fly under AFR and the quantity of IFR aircraft in the airspace decreases, the 
opportunities for sector combination and facility consolidation may increase. Terminal facilities 
would likely be mostly unchanged, as they continue to provide airport access to the mix of 
aircraft capabilities.  
AFR operations will typically be flown using Area Navigation (RNAV) equipment and will not 
require any route structure for either navigation or separation. The flights are "trajectory-based", 
meaning that a path through space, defined in three dimensions and with planned speeds along 
track, is created in the flight planning system, entered into the aircraft FMS, and executed by the 
pilot and/or autopilot. This 4D trajectory is planned for business and safety considerations, is 
flight-specific, and is not charted. 
Route and airway information may continue to be published for use by traditional IFR flights but 
would not typically be used in the description of AFR flight trajectories.  Published terminal 
routes, IFR departure and noise abatement procedures, and instrument approach procedures do 
not require modification for the accommodation of AFR flights.  Such flights may or may not 
use them, as permitted by the ANSP clearance.  It is expected that more use will be made of 
RNAV-based terminal procedures in the future for IFR aircraft, and these also may or may not 
be used by AFR flights.  For safety, minimum obstacle clearance altitudes will be observed by 
AFR aircraft while operating in IMC. 
6.2. Navigation and Surveillance Services 
AFR operations will use the prevailing navigation services available without imposing any 
special requirements.  GPS services will likely be available throughout the subject operating 
region, with predictable performance and availability. Ground Based Augmentation Systems will 
also likely be ubiquitous in this airspace, although the extra precision is not a requirement for 
AFR.  Airborne inertial systems will provide both attitude information and a coasting capability 
for navigation in areas and at times of GPS outage. Backup en route navigation for longer 
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periods may be available through independent systems such as Loran, Distance Measuring 
Equipment, or a data link-dependent service like multilateration positioning, sent to the aircraft 
for use in navigation.
The primary form of surveillance for both the ANSP and AFR aircraft operators will be ADS-B, 
supplying position and velocity information directly from the traffic aircraft.  Backup 
surveillance on the ground will be through a combination of retained primary/secondary radars 
and transponder-based multilateration. The primary radar coverage will likely be only that 
needed for military and national security requirements.  The backup airborne surveillance source 
will be the TIS-B service from the ground, which supplies aircraft with the best information 
available to the ground service provider. To be a viable backup for ADS-B surveillance used in 
AFR operations, TIS-B performance may have to be improved over the current radar-based 
service.  For collision avoidance, it is assumed that TCAS, which has its own means for 
surveillance, will be retained and likely enhanced. 
6.3. Air/Ground Communications 
As long as traditional IFR services are provided in a given airspace, the air/ground voice 
frequency in use for that service will be monitored in the cockpits of AFR flights.  Increasingly, 
air/ground communications with AFR flights will be data communications.  Aeronautical 
information services on the status of weather, airports and SUA will be requested and received 
over existing or new data links.  In the midterm, ETAs, RTAs, and other traffic management 
initiative information will be transmitted and negotiated through CPDLC. Trajectory information 
on IFR flights will also be made available to AFR aircraft through data link. In the far term, all 
communications between AFR aircraft and ground services are expected to be airborne 
automation to ground automation, through CPDLC or other prescribed data communication 
systems.  Voice communication will remain as a mechanism for coordination and emergency 
communications.
6.4. Air-to-Air Communications 
Trajectory information used on AFR flights in the ASAS separation functions will be broadcast 
as part of the ADS-B message. When such intent information is not available, the ADS-B 
message will still contain the state vector for use by the separation algorithms. As all of this 
information is broadcast, the AFR concept has no requirement for addressed air-to-air data 
communications other than that already in place for TCAS.
Air-to-air voice communications are not required for AFR flight.  In rare abnormal or emergency 
situations, it may be useful, but not required, to have this capability, and the IFR ANSP 
frequency might be used during the initial time period when AFRs are guarding that channel.  In 
the future, a single dedicated channel may be provided for emergency voice guard, as is done 
over oceans today. 
6.5. Shared Airspace for Mixed Operations 
AFR operations are designed to be immediately available to the first aircraft equipped and 
authorized to perform them.  Thus the occurrence of AFR, IFR, and VFR operators flying 
simultaneously in shared airspace will be both commonplace and safe.  AFR will begin as far 
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less than one percent of the operations in the airspace but could potentially grow to encompass 
most operations within a few decades.  Most of the VFR operations flown by sophisticated
aircraft today may become AFR in the future, given the weather-independent flexibility provided 
by AFR and reductions in equipment costs through economy of scale.  It is expected that VFR 
will continue at low altitudes and for recreational and special uses indefinitely.   
6.6. Special Use Airspace and Weather Hazard Avoidance 
The existing classifications of SUA require no modification for AFR flight.  The restrictions to 
civil operations imposed by these restricted areas are the same regardless of the operating flight 
rules.  In the future, when access to restricted airspace becomes more dynamic, it is expected that 
active and inactive status information will be available directly to all operators through the 
SWIM system.  If an SUA changes status, the flight crew will receive the update and can replan 
their trajectory en route.  Alternatively, a reroute can be coordinated through a flight operations 
service.  Temporary flight restrictions issued with short notice can be communicated to AFR 
aircraft by the ANSP through CPDLC or voice communications.  The flight crew can then 
immediately replan to avoid the restricted airspace. 
AFR flights will not require en route hazardous weather re-routing services by the ANSP.  The 
responsibility for avoiding areas of hazardous weather will remain with the flight crew, 
supported by an AOC or flight operations service when available.  It is assumed that the 
NextGen concept of the 4D Weather Cube (ref. 11) will be available in the midterm to supply 
weather hazard information to supplement onboard detection and warning systems for 
convective activity, wind shear, airframe icing, and clear air turbulence.  Weather tolerance 
limits will be specific to the operation and approved as part of the operations specifications for 
airlines.  AFR aircraft will have the flexibility to determine their optimal route through or around 
the weather, according to their individual business objectives and risk tolerance. As most aircraft 
in this environment may be operating in a tactical mode, the ASAS must be robust enough to 
ensure safety with little or no intent information available beyond the state vector and target 
states.   
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7. System Requirements 
This section discusses the expected high-level system and technical requirements to enable AFR 
operations.  Requirements are presented for the AFR aircraft and the ANSP. 
7.1. Aircraft Requirements 
To file and fly under AFR, the aircraft must be properly equipped for IFR flight through all 
airspace classifications along its filed flight-plan route. In addition, the following AFR-related 
equipment must be installed and functional at the time of departure to support AFR flight. 
7.1.1. ADS-B Out and In 
ADS-B Out and In are required of all AFR aircraft to support the cooperative surveillance 
environment.   
The ADS-B Out system will consist of positioning navigational equipment, such as GPS, a 
processor capable of composing ADS-B messages, and data communications equipment capable 
of broadcasting the messages at the specified intervals on either the Universal Access 
Transceiver (UAT) or Mode S frequencies.  The content, format, broadcast intervals, and 
transmission range of the ADS-B Out messages will be the subject of detailed aviation system 
and operational performance specifications applicable to AFR operations.  These specifications 
are beyond the scope of this document, and will likely require updates or revisions to the current 
ADS-B Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) and Minimum Operational 
Performance Standards (MOPS) (refs. 18-20) to support AFR operations.  ADS-B Out 
information to support AFR operations is expected to include:   
Minimum content 
Aircraft identity and operational status (e.g., AFR/IFR, navigation accuracy) 
State vector (e.g., position, velocity, altitude, vertical rate) 
Additional content, possibly required 
Target state (e.g., target or maintained altitude, target or maintained heading/track) 
Trajectory changes (e.g., 4D positions of any TCPs out to a specified time horizon) 
Trajectory constraints (e.g., RTA at a specified fix) 
ADS-B In serves as the primary surveillance source for AFR operations.  The ADS-B In system 
will consist of equipment capable of receiving ADS-B messages from other aircraft on either the 
UAT or Mode S frequencies (assuming a rebroadcast service is provided by the ANSP) and 
providing the information to a flight crew display and to an ASAS processing system containing 
approved separation logic. 
7.1.2. TIS-B
The TIS-B receiver serves both as the backup surveillance source for the ADS-B In system and a 
primary surveillance source for non-broadcasting traffic aircraft.  The TIS-B receiving 
equipment must be capable of decoding the TIS-B messages and providing the information to the 
flight crew display and to the ASAS processing system containing approved separation logic.
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For AFR operations solely in non-ANSP-managed airspace or airspace outside of TIS-B 
coverage, an operating TIS-B receiver may not be required.  However, a redundant ADS-B In 
receiver may be necessary to fulfill the backup surveillance source requirement. Otherwise, AFR 
aircraft must revert to VFR and operate in VMC whenever both the primary and backup sources 
of airborne surveillance are not available. 
7.1.3. ASAS Processor and Separation Logic 
A processor certified for the primary separation function is required and must be completely 
independent of TCAS.  The processor would be integrated with the aircraft avionics system so 
that it can receive and send information pertinent to the separation function.  Inputs to this 
processor would come from the ADS-B receiver, TIS-B receiver, the navigation system or FMS, 
autoflight settings, and flight crew interfaces. 
The separation logic in the ASAS processor must include the functions of own-ship trajectory 
prediction, traffic aircraft trajectory prediction (or reconstruction), conflict detection, conflict 
resolution, and conflict prevention.  Mechanisms must be in place to apply appropriate 
separation standards, time horizons, right-of-way rules, and maneuver coordination.  Additional 
factors that the separation logic should consider (but may demote in criticality when needed to 
preserve traffic separation) include area hazards such as convective weather and SUA, and 
ANSP-supplied trajectory constraints such as an RTA or other crossing restrictions. 
The separation logic may include a strategic mode but must include at least a tactical mode.  The 
strategic separation mode provides certain advantages in AFR operations that may be required in 
some airspace.  If it is required anywhere, it will likely be in Class A airspace where IFR 
Trajectory-Based Operations are expected to be prevalent. Alternatively, it might be required for 
a certain class of flight operations, such as those conducted under FAR Part 121.  The strategic 
separation logic may not be required for some operators, such as GA operators, who may not 
have the necessary navigation equipment (e.g., FMS) or other avionics systems to support it. 
Certain airspace access restrictions may apply to AFR aircraft without the strategic mode 
capability. 
The tactical separation logic will be required for AFR in all airspace as a safety backup to the 
strategic system (for those carrying it) or for primary separation (for those not).  This tactical 
separation mode may be capable of using trajectory intent information when it is available, but 
will always be capable of using state-based information transmitted for all AFR and IFR flights.  
The tactical system may require a higher level of certification than the strategic system, given its 
safety-critical role.  
The design and features of ASAS avionics systems for AFR operations may vary between 
aircraft and can evolve and be improved via periodic upgrades.  Certain functions, however, may 
be required to meet common standards to ensure implicit coordination mechanisms described in 
Section 4.5 are effective.  Primary examples include the functions that support the application of 
right-of-way rules and maneuver coordination. 
7.1.4. ASAS controls, displays, and aural alerting 
The ASAS must provide the flight crew with controls, display of information, and aural alerts as 
necessary to maintain adequate awareness and perform the procedures of self-separation.  
Controls enable the pilot to inform the ASAS of desired trajectory changes and to interact with 
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the display of traffic and conflict information.  ASAS information may be integrated into 
forward field-of-view displays, Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) displays, or FMS interfaces, as 
appropriate to the criticality of the information.  They must communicate the existence of 
conflicts, the associated urgency level, and the maneuver guidance for conflict resolution.  They 
must also indicate whether provisional trajectory changes are conflicted.  The FMS or EFB may 
be used as a crew input device for the ASAS.  Aural alerts shall be used to draw flight crew 
attention to conflicts and shall be independent of the TCAS aural alerting system.  Some 
installations may require integration with existing flight-deck alerting systems, such as the 
Engine Indications and Crew Alerting System. 
7.1.5. TCAS 
An approved TCAS II (or later) system is required.  The TCAS surveillance, processing, and 
aural alerting systems must be completely independent of the ASAS and ideally be powered by a 
separate electrical bus, if available.  TCAS may share traffic and resolution advisory display 
space on the same multi-function interfaces used for displaying ASAS information. 
7.1.6. Data Communications 
The AFR requirement for addressed air/ground data communications (e.g., CPDLC) is dependent 
on the ANSP requirements for that airspace, which will likely evolve over time and may vary by 
the type of aircraft (e.g., some GA aircraft may be exempt).  Data communication equipment, if 
required, must be capable of automatically transmitting trajectory information to the ANSP 
including changes and pertinent ETAs.  Additional capability that may facilitate AFR operations 
includes the receipt of ANSP messages regarding arrival constraints, TFM initiatives, weather 
and SUA hazards, voice frequency changes, and airport conditions for arrival planning.  CPDLC 
will be appropriate for some of these functions, and an alternate data link may be necessary for 
others, such as the receipt of SWIM uplinks. 
7.2. ANSP Requirements 
In order to accommodate AFR within airspace containing IFR aircraft, the ANSP may be 
required to have or provide the following systems, capabilities, or services. 
7.2.1. Alternate surveillance broadcast 
To support AFR (and other ADS-B In applications), the ANSP shall provide an alternate ground-
based surveillance source and broadcast system (TIS-B).  The alternate source may be radar, 
multilateration, or some other surveillance mechanism, but it should provide the most accurate 
and reliable surveillance data available.  Broadcast stations should provide coverage of all en 
route and terminal airspace in which IFR aircraft operate.  Ideally, the information content would 
mimic the information contained in ADS-B Out messages, but should at least provide basic 
identification, position, altitude, and velocity vector information.   
TIS-B coverage should be made available in all Class A, B, C, D, and E airspace.  This could be 
accomplished by installing TIS-B transmitters at all ADS-B ground stations.  TIS-B filtering of 
aircraft by quadrant and traffic proximity, as currently instantiated, must be discontinued to 
eliminate gaps in service. 
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As an additional co-located service, the ANSP shall provide rebroadcasting of ADS-B messages, 
enabling mixed operations of UAT and Mode S aircraft.  It may also be advantageous to use this 
system to extend the reception range of ADS-B. 
7.2.2. Trajectory intent information for IFR aircraft 
For safety and the support of efficient mixed operations, the ANSP may be required to provide to 
AFR aircraft an alternate source of near-term IFR aircraft trajectory intent information for those 
IFR aircraft unable or not mandated to broadcast this information.  The information would range 
from the next TCP up to the most recently cleared trajectory for the IFR aircraft extending to a 
specified horizon (e.g., 25 minutes).  Possible mechanisms for providing this information are 
uplink from the NextGen SWIM system, either a general broadcast or by response to an AFR 
downlinked request, or uplink directly from ANSP trajectory automation via automated CPDLC. 
If the standards for ADS-B are updated in the future, the addition of trajectory information 
broadcast from the IFR aircraft auto-flight system would be the best way to obtain this 
information. 
7.2.3. Controller display of AFR aircraft and support for safety services 
The display of AFR aircraft to controllers will likely be similar to the display of VFR aircraft, 
i.e., at their discretion, a reduced data block and (possibly) unique symbology.  Information 
displayed in the data block would likely include the call sign, altitude, and AFR status.  The 
controller would be able to display the trajectory intent of the aircraft, if so desired. 
The controller will likely require support for traffic advisories and safety alerts.  The level of 
support will depend on the IFR operations underway in the airspace (i.e., current day operations 
vs. future TBO) and the ANSP automated decision support tools available.  
ANSP sector capacity tools, such as today’s Monitor Alert Parameter, will need to be adjusted to 
remove the AFR traffic from the IFR traffic population in the sector. 
7.2.4. Data communications  
Data communications capability should be provided to send automatic messages for frequency 
changes, enabling the AFR flight crew to keep a listening watch on the sector frequency.  Data 
communication may also be useful for transmitting other information such as arrival constraints 
and clearances for the AFR aircraft to expect upon reaching terminal airspace.  If the ANSP 
requires real-time trajectory change and ETA information from AFR aircraft, it will need to 
provide the data link to automatically receive and process this information. 
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8. Non-Normal Operations 
This section sets forth a qualitative discussion of failures, both mechanical and human, and the 
contingency procedures that may be used by AFR aircraft in the event of such failures.  For each 
type of failure, the qualitative impact of the failures is presented, followed by contingency 
actions that could be taken to mitigate the risk of loss of separation or mid-air collision.  This 
high-level presentation is commensurate with this document’s objective of presenting an overall 
description of the AFR concept.  It is not intended to be a detailed enumeration of crew 
procedures or system requirements, nor is it an actual safety risk analysis associated with the 
various probabilities of such failures or the total system risk from implementing AFR.  The 
information presented is intended to support such a risk analysis, when it is made. 
8.1. Surveillance Failures 
8.1.1. Impact
If the trajectories of an AFR aircraft (i.e., the subject aircraft) and a traffic aircraft (i.e., the 
reference aircraft) are in conflict, but a surveillance subsystem failure prevents the detection of 
the conflict, safety will be impaired to a degree directly related to the specific surveillance 
impairment.  The surveillance layers to be considered are ADS-B Out (primary source), TIS-B 
(backup source), ADS-B rebroadcasting (ADS-R), ADS-B In, TCAS, and visual sighting. 
ADS-B is a highly distributed surveillance system that is not generally vulnerable to single-point 
failures (other than the reception system on the subject aircraft, as discussed below).  ADS-B Out 
surveillance will be impaired if there is a navigation failure deteriorating the positioning 
accuracy of the reference aircraft.  It will also be impaired if a reference aircraft avionics unit 
does not create and broadcast the ADS-B Out message as designed.  Any of these failures affect 
surveillance of the single reference aircraft and would create a small reduction in system safety. 
TIS-B surveillance does not depend on the navigation systems in either the reference or subject 
aircraft, since positions of aircraft are derived from ground-based primary and secondary radar or 
from multilateration.  TIS-B is heavily reliant on the Mode A/C or Mode S transponders in 
aircraft to remotely determine its position information.  A failure of an onboard transponder 
would cause a limited TIS-B failure affecting surveillance of only that single reference aircraft.  
TIS-B surveillance could fail more extensively, affecting surveillance of all covered aircraft, if 
the radar system and multilateration fail, or the ground processing of the position data into TIS-B 
messages shut down, or the broadcast data link system failed.  TIS-B ground transmitters will 
have some overlapping coverage, so a single site failure might leave a hole in surveillance 
coverage, but not total lost coverage.  In airspace where ADS-B Out will be required for primary 
surveillance, the system safety reduction from failures of the backup TIS-B system will be small.   
Failure of ADS-R would share impact characteristics with a TIS-B station failure, since they will 
typically use common ground equipment.  The failure would impede reception of all UAT 
aircraft by Mode S aircraft, and vice versa. 
A failure of ADS-B In on the subject aircraft would be more serious than the aforementioned 
failures.  If the failure is specific to the receipt or processing of ADS-B data, the use of TIS-B as 
the alternate surveillance source may be used for all traffic aircraft.  Failure of the 1030 MHz 
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receiver would prevent reception of ADS-B, TIS-B, and ADS-R messages.  The inability of a 
subject aircraft to receive these services would place its ability to continue under AFR in serious 
jeopardy, as nominal surveillance of all traffic would be lost.  The impact on safety would be 
dependent on the operating modes of the traffic aircraft.  For encounters with reference aircraft 
that are AFR, the reduction in safety is mitigated by the improbability of simultaneous ADS-B In 
failures on both aircraft.  For encounters with IFR reference aircraft, the impact on safety 
depends on whether the ANSP is informed of the AFR aircraft’s onboard surveillance failure and 
the time and degrees of freedom available to take action. 
TCAS has a separate antenna, receiver, and processor from the ADS-B, TIS-B, and ASAS 
systems.  As long as the transponders on all proximate reference aircraft are operable, this back 
up surveillance system will provide collision protection, but it will not prevent a loss of nominal 
separation.  As is the case for IFR aircraft today, failure of TCAS would deprive an AFR aircraft 
of the backup system for the nominal separation assurance system. 
The use of visual “see and avoid” procedures is the final safety net, but can be thwarted by flight 
in IMC.  It is also limited by reduced visibility and the limited areas visible around the aircraft 
through the cockpit windows. 
8.1.2. Contingency actions 
A GPS outage or degradation of service would be reflected in the navigation figure of merit, 
which is communicated in the ADS-B message and available for use by receiving aircraft.  The 
applied separation values and look-ahead times would be adjusted as appropriate for the reduced 
navigational performance reflected in the surveillance message.  Because of measures being 
taken to make the GPS service more robust, widespread outages of GPS service should be very 
rare in the future, as well as more predictable.  Inertial reference systems would provide a 
suitable temporary alternative, if needed. 
The loss of ADS-B Out information from a single reference aircraft would mean that the subject 
aircraft’s ASAS separation functions (i.e., CD, CR, and CP) would use TIS-B for that aircraft 
instead.  Therefore, with TIS-B available as backup, losing ADS-B Out on a single aircraft 
would have negligible impact on safety or efficiency.  The lower precision of TIS-B surveillance 
data will mean that larger target separation values and possibly slightly longer look-ahead times 
would be used in the ASAS separation logic.  In most aircraft, dual receivers would be available, 
making the loss of all ADS-B and TIS-B surveillance based upon on-board receiver failure a 
very remote possibility.  If both sources of surveillance information from a single reference 
aircraft were lost, a determination would be made, using the most recent surveillance data, of the 
likelihood of a conflict with that aircraft.  If the possibility exists, action will be taken to adjust 
the trajectory to a non-conflicting course and altitude using a wide separation margin (e.g., three 
times the normal standard).   
Total loss of both ADS-B In and TIS-B during AFR flight would require one of two contingency 
actions.  The flight could leave Class A airspace, seek VMC, and continue under VFR until a 
point of landing.  Alternatively, the flight could request an IFR clearance.  Since this is an 
aircraft hardware failure and not a system failure, this particular failure mode would occur rarely 
and for only a single subject aircraft, making reversion to IFR flight generally feasible for the 
ground system.
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In locations where no ground system is be available to provide en route IFR separation service, 
and where switching to VFR is not feasible, a total loss of airborne surveillance would prompt 
the selection of a specially assigned transponder code, such as 7777, that would indicate this 
failure to other aircraft.  This procedure is similar to the more general declaration of emergency, 
which already gives such aircraft right-of-way over all other flights.  In this case, the ASAS 
separation logic on other aircraft (and in the ANSP) would recognize the code and automatically 
treat any conflict with this aircraft by giving it the right-of-way.  The TFM function and other 
voice and data communications would be unaffected by this failure, so the flight could 
potentially proceed along its current business trajectory to the destination if not too distant, or a 
decision to divert could be made. 
A TCAS failure on an AFR aircraft, when normal ADS-B and TIS-B surveillance is available, 
would only require that the unit be fixed at the first point of landing.  As is done today, the flight 
could continue to its intended destination or divert to a location where the maintenance could 
more easily be performed.   
8.2. ASAS Processing Failures 
8.2.1. Impact
A failure of the ASAS logic processor would deprive the flight crew of automatic detection of 
conflicts and the provision of guidance to resolve those conflicts.  The flight crew would be left 
with the task of analyzing the traffic situation visually on the display and determining mentally 
the trajectory to fly so as not to encroach upon any nominal protected airspace.  Pilot workload 
may preclude the possibility of this procedure. 
When ASAS separation logic is executed in strategic and tactical modes, losing one might not 
mean losing the other, depending on the failure site and the avionics architecture.  Of the two, 
losing the tactical mode would be more serious.  Whereas the strategic mode is focused more on 
longer time horizons and efficiency, the tactical mode is focused primarily on safety.  It would 
contain the logic for maneuver coordination and be more responsive for short-notice separation 
assurance. 
In the strategic separation mode, the FMS may be used to host the resolution trajectory, amongst 
other functions.  Where this is the case, loss of the FMS computer would make the strategic 
mode unavailable.  Other implementations place this function outside the FMS, for instance, on 
an EFB display.  In this case, only the FMS-coupled autopilot mode for carrying out the strategic 
resolution would be lost. 
Ancillary avionics control boxes that serve as part of the human/computer interface could also 
fail, making use of the ASAS separation functions more difficult for the flight crew. The impact 
of a failure on crew workload would be a function of the availability of redundant software 
control of the physical control functions. 
8.2.2. Contingency actions 
Assuming the ASAS system is designed to a high assurance level, the chance of a processing 
failure is very unlikely. Most commercial aircraft would likely have a redundant ASAS 
architecture, and switching to the operational ASAS processor would be automatic, providing 
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near-continuous service with full functionality.  An avionics processing failure rendering some 
or all of the separation logic inoperative would be handled in a manner depending on what 
remains functional. If only the strategic functions failed, the flight could continue using the 
tactical guidance.  If the tactical portion failed but the traffic display was complete and the 
strategic functions still available, the flight could continue to destination if the display were 
continuously monitored by at least one flight crewmember for the remainder of that flight.  The 
crew would activate the separation boundary feature on the display (showing the minimum 
permissible separation) around all proximate aircraft and manually avoid all for which no 
strategic resolution assistance was available.  As an alternative to this degraded mode, the flight 
crew could request an IFR clearance if the service is available in the airspace. 
In smaller aircraft without dual equipage of the ASAS avionics, loss of either surveillance or 
separation processing would be treated like a total communications failure under IFR, with the 
addition of selecting 7777 on the transponder.  The procedure would be to seek VMC, proceed 
under VFR, and land as soon as practicable.  Alternately, an IFR clearance can be requested. 
Loss of an FMS in most airline aircraft with dual FMS equipment means relying on the 
remaining operational FMS for the balance of the flight.  The ASAS would be unaffected, as it 
will be designed to work through either the installed FMS or a dedicated processor.  On aircraft 
with only one FMS, its loss might be equivalent to losing the strategic mode of ASAS.  The 
flight could continue to the destination under AFR using tactical guidance alone. 
The design of the ASAS avionics interface might consider making flight crew control of the 
functions available through both physical knobs and buttons and through point-and-click 
software logic.  With this redundancy, a failure of either mode would not impair use of the 
functions.
8.3. Display and Alerting Failures 
8.3.1. Impact
In glass cockpit aircraft with navigation and primary flight displays, the visual displays 
associated with the ASAS separation functions may share the ND, some parts of the PFD, and 
the MCDU display screen.  A failure of the ND would affect not just the ability to see the traffic 
situation and the strategic conflict resolutions, but also the relationship of the aircraft to the basic 
route guidance coming from the FMS.  While the tactical separation mode could still be used, 
loss of the ND represents a serious impairment to the AFR capability.   
Loss of the PFD would be more serious because of the loss of tactical resolution guidance as 
well as basic attitude, altitude and speed awareness.  A redundant location for the basic flight 
information is already required by regulation, and the same may hold true for tactical separation 
maneuver information. 
Aural alerting would be a part of the ASAS equipment design, used at a minimum to call the 
crew’s attention to a conflict that needed to be expeditiously resolved.  The aural alerting system 
could also be used as a redundant source of guidance for tactical resolution maneuvers, in a 
manner similar to that implemented in TCAS.  In order to preserve true back up status, different 
aural systems should be used for ASAS and TCAS.  Then, a failure of the ASAS aural system 
would not be as serious a loss. 
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8.3.2. Contingency actions 
The display systems for primary flight and navigation information are generally multi-function 
displays that are capable of accepting any function on any display.  Thus, if there are three or 
more such displays in the cockpit, a loss of one of them would not impair the functions they 
serve, including the display of ASAS separation function information.  Loss of a second display 
such that the ND and PFD could not be viewed together would require that all tactical resolution 
guidance be shown on the remaining PFD. Under this scenario, the flight could continue to 
destination in a tactical mode, degraded from the nominal state but still safe in terms of 
separation.  Alternatively, the flight crew could request an IFR clearance. 
The loss of the aural alerting function of ASAS would require that at least one of the flight crew 
members visually monitor the displays for the balance of the flight.  No further flight of that 
aircraft would be permitted under AFR until the aural alerting system was fixed.  The ASAS 
aural alerting system must be completely separate from the TCAS aural alerting system so that 
TCAS can remain an independent safety backup. 
8.4. Air / Ground Communication Failures 
8.4.1. Impact
Both voice and data communications are expected to be used in the subject environment and they 
serve to back up each other in the event of failure of one. Voice failures in particular would have 
far less impact than they do today since voice communication is not a normal part of AFR 
operations. The loss of data communications would deny the full path trajectory information 
from being sent to the ANSP and the receipt of near-term intent on IFR flights. Neither of these 
losses impacts the safety of AFR operations because they improve efficiency rather than safety. 
Terminal and airport operations performed using traditional IFR techniques would be impacted 
the most by communications failures in the same manner as today. 
8.4.2. Contingency actions 
Redundant communication equipment is expected to be required both for voice and data 
communications. As these will be required by NextGen operations exclusive of AFR, the 
requirement is not an additional burden to AFR. Lost communication procedures call for the 
pilot to proceed according to the last clearance received and to begin the approach at the ETA for 
the destination airport. An AFR flight with lost voice communication would be able to proceed 
normally using data communications, and vice versa. In the extremely rare event that all voice 
and all data communications were lost, the existing lost communication procedures in the 
regulations would apply. The remaining presence of ASAS in addition to TCAS would provide 
even greater safety during communications failures than the same failures under IFR without 
ASAS. 
8.5. Human Failures 
8.5.1. Impact
In automatic control systems, human failures are difficult to predict and protect against.  In AFR, 
means do exist to overcome most human failures.  AFR is considerably less vulnerable to the 
catastrophic effects of human failure than the current ATM system because of the one-to-one 
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relationships between AFR flight crews and their aircraft as opposed to the one-to-many between 
controllers and aircraft..  A single controller may be responsible for the separation of a dozen or 
more aircraft, while an AFR flight crew (and often two flight crews) is only responsible for one.  
In any given separation encounter, two flight crews, one on each aircraft, can detect and resolve 
the same conflict.  Instead of one person being responsible for all potential conflicts among 
twelve or more aircraft, two to four people are each responsible for just one potential conflict. 
One human failure mode in an AFR aircraft is delayed reaction, resulting in a later application of 
trajectory modification than is modeled in the ASAS separation logic. This pilot delay can render 
an implemented CR trajectory ineffective at maintaining the desired separation.  The system can 
compensate by continually monitoring the progress of the implemented solution and presenting 
an alternate trajectory should the modeled resolution no longer be sufficient because of late 
reaction by the pilot or any other cause altering the encounter. 
A more serious human failing is missing and not responding at all to the resolution guidance, in 
any of its iterations prior to loss of separation.  Such a human failing is tantamount to a system 
failure or shutdown, and it must be accounted for in system design.  Aural alerting will help to 
reduce the likelihood of this occurring.  Additionally, having self-separation capability on both 
aircraft in the encounter provides an effective back up to this failure.  In the event of this 
occurrence in conflicts with IFR aircraft, the ANSP will be provided automation support to issue 
safety alerts to the pilots of either or both aircraft.  However, responsibility for action remains 
with the AFR pilot. 
Another human failure is acting contrary to the guidance provided.  This could possibly be more 
serious than taking no action, if it resulted in further reducing the projected separation.  It is 
presumed that this failure would be the result of an error by the flight crew, not a deliberate 
attempt to create a collision.  The ASAS separation logic would continue to provide corrective 
guidance to maintain separation or safely regain it if lost. This guidance may use any maneuver 
dimension (or a combination) and will also occur on both aircraft in the conflict, thus mitigating 
the hazard. 
8.5.2. Contingency actions 
The human failure to cause the airplane to follow a new trajectory in a timely fashion is handled 
by continuing computations and guidance from the ASAS separation logic, commanding ever 
increasing deviations from the original trajectory as needed to accomplish the separation 
objective in the remaining time.  Increased turn and climb rates, larger heading changes, and the 
use of the alternate resolution dimension, if only one was used initially, would be used.  
Increasingly urgent aural messages would also be used to make the crew aware of an unresolved 
situation.  These would generally be sufficient to reengage the crew to initiate the necessary 
maneuvers in time to prevent a separation loss. 
Failure to follow ASAS guidance following a conflict alert is comparable to ignoring a 
controller’s instruction and carries the same seriousness.  If a separation loss does occur, the 
ASAS would continue to provide guidance to safely reestablish the required separation.  TCAS 
would also continue to operate as an independent system and may alert both aircraft to a 
potential near collision and provide both with coordinated avoidance maneuvers.  If in VMC, the 
pilots might also see and avoid each other. 
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9. Required Activities for Implementation 
Throughout this document, references have been made to additional standards, procedures, rules, 
and training that will be needed but are beyond the scope of this document. This section 
addresses those needed activities by government and industry participants for the development, 
approval, and implementation of the AFR capability. 
9.1. Standards 
Standards-setting activities supporting AFR should be undertaken by FAA advisory committees 
such as RTCA, including updating the ADS-B MASPS and MOPS (refs. 18-20) to meet AFR 
requirements, possibly generating MASPS specifically for AFR, and generating MOPS for 
ASAS equipment to be certified for AFR use. These should be specific enough to enable 
interoperability among various manufacturers’ equipment through use of common rule sets, for 
both high- and low-end avionics. These standards, when completed, would be used by FAA in 
the rule-making and approval processes. 
9.2. Research studies 
Research studies to verify assumptions, design decisions, and expected behaviors mentioned in 
the document should be continued by NASA, FAA, and their contractors. Industry participants 
should be included in these research activities.  Examples include a study to verify the values 
chosen for separation buffers outside the IFR separation minima and appropriate separation 
values for AFR/AFR conflicts. Human-in-the-loop simulations should be followed by flight 
testing the designs and behaviors for concept verification. 
9.3. Safety analysis 
A system safety analysis should be performed using the values for design parameters chosen for 
the MASPS and MOPS, with iteration as necessary to ensure safe values are used in the final 
avionics and automation designs. The safety analyses will also support rule-making, system and 
procedures approvals, and the determination of liability accommodations. TCAS approvals might 
serve as models in this activity. 
9.4. Ground infrastructure 
Upgrades will be needed to the existing ground services, TIS-B and ADS-R, to ensure the back-
up surveillance and navigation functions meet the required parametric values found in the safety 
analysis. 
9.5. Policies
FAA rule-making should commence for the modification and creation of operating and training 
regulations for AFR, mostly in FAR Parts 61, 91, 135, and 121, and others as necessary. 
9.6. Training and education 
Initial and re-current training programs will be needed for pilots and familiarization training for 
controllers to use and recognize the use of AFR procedures. General education of the flying 
population to the new rules would accompany this activity. 
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10. Conclusion 
This document proposes the creation of a new set of official operating regulations, referred to as 
Autonomous Flight Rules (AFR).  AFR is a flight operating concept designed to improve access 
and flexibility in airspace use while not increasing and possibly decreasing the burden on ANSP 
services. The objective of the AFR concept is to provide an alternative mode of aircraft 
trajectory-based operations that is safe, efficient, flexible, cost effective, and low risk for aircraft 
operators; that minimally subjects AFR aircraft to capacity-driven operational restrictions; and 
that coexists with existing modes of operation without causing disruption of such flights.  The 
AFR concept extends the NextGen vision for self-separation to mixed operations in all classes of 
airspace. It is anticipated that AFR operations will provide a mechanism for significant 
expansion of en route airspace system capacity, which would benefit the ANSP and all airspace 
users.
By leveraging the technologies of GPS, ADS-B, and flight-deck automation software with 
separation functions, aircraft operating under AFR keep track of all other aircraft in the local 
airspace and take responsibility for maintaining safe separation from these aircraft, as well as 
SUA and all other flight hazards. AFR provides the operating rules and procedures to enable 
sufficient coordination with others so that all maneuvers are safe and conflicts are handled in a 
timely and orderly manner. The burden of separation of AFR aircraft is removed from the ANSP 
by always giving right-of-way to IFR aircraft.  In addition, AFR aircraft will maintain a 
sufficient distance from IFR aircraft such that few if any constraints are placed on a controller's 
freedom of action with IFR aircraft under his control as a result of AFR aircraft present in the 
airspace. 
Arrival and departure operations are integrated by operating AFR aircraft similar to IFR flights 
during takeoff, approach, and landing. AFR flights participate in TFM initiatives at capacity-
constrained airports, providing initial and updated ETAs for use in the TFM program, and 
meeting RTA constraints at the terminal airspace boundary when required. AFR flights need not 
be included in en route TFM initiatives, as they shoulder their own separation responsibility and 
will remain sufficiently clear of IFR aircraft, not constraining ANSP management of any IFR 
aircraft. 
The safety requirements for this new form of primary separation are expected to be met through 
independent means of backup surveillance and redundancy in systems, a layered approach to 
separation assurance and collision avoidance, and continued human involvement in the review of 
computer-generated flight guidance information. It is expected that the AFR concept may 
substantially improve the level of safety of NAS operations overall due to the greater number of 
systems and people involved in ensuring separation under all circumstances, compared to current 
operations. Having the entire control loop resident in the aircraft also removes exposure to 
communications failures on separation safety. 
The potential benefits of using AFR as an additional Operational Improvement in the NextGen 
environment are expected to be substantial to both airspace users and service providers. Greater 
use of the available airspace, reduced flight delays, greater flight efficiency and operational 
flexibility, reduced burden on ANSP resources, and a gradual yet robust transition to a 
modernized air transportation system all underscore the importance of moving ahead with the 
identified activities to enable this operating concept. 
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Acronym List 
4D  4 Dimensional (3 dimensional position plus time) 
ADS-B  Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
ADS-B In Receiving ADS-B Messages 
ADS-B Out Broadcasting ADS-B Messages  
ADS-R  Rebroadcasting ADS-B Messages 
AFR  Autonomous Flight Rules 
ANSP  Air Navigation Service Provider 
ASAS  Airborne Separation Assistance System 
ATC  Air Traffic Control 
ATM  Air Traffic Management 
CD  Conflict Detection 
CP  Conflict Prevention 
CPDLC Controller Pilot Data Link Communications 
CR  Conflict Resolution 
EFB  Electronic Flight Bag 
ETA  Estimated Time of Arrival 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR  Federal Aviation Regulations 
FMS  Flight Management System 
GA  General Aviation 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
IFR  Instrument Flight Rules 
IM  Interval Management 
IMC  Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
LOS  Loss of Separation 
MASPS Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards 
MCDU  Multifunction Control and Display Unit 
MOPS  Minimum Operational Performance Standards
NAS  National Airspace System 
ND  Navigation Display 
NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System 
OPD  Optimized Profile Descent 
PFD  Primary Flight Display 
RNAV  Area Navigation 
RTA  Required Time of Arrival 
SUA  Special Use Airspace 
SWIM  System Wide Information Management 
TBO  Trajectory Based Operations 
TCAS  Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
TCP  Trajectory Change Point 
TFM  Traffic Flow Management 
TIS-B  Traffic Information Service Broadcast 
TRACON Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility 
UAS  Unmanned Aircraft System 
UAT  Universal Access Transceiver  
VFR  Visual Flight Rules 
VMC  Visual Meteorological Conditions  
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